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The formalisations that exist in an organisation are thought to have a substantial influence on 
how employees interpret the organisation’s Management Control System (MCS) (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008). Previously, researchers claimed that an increase in formalisation would have a 
negative attitudinal effect on employees, while a decrease induces an autonomous and positive 
view of the MCS (Burns & Stalker, 1969). Adler & Borys (1996) broke with this notion and 
argued that it is not the degree of formalisation that determines employee interpretation, but 
rather the distinctive features of the way rules and procedures are designed and implemented. 
The purpose of this study is to explore how the introduction of two contradictory 
formalisations influences the users’ interpretation of the MCS in an organisation. 
This thesis conducts a case study of Statoil who have recently introduced two contradictory 
degrees of formalisations to their MCS. One is a decrease where the aim has been to give 
employees more freedom to decide what rules and regulations should be defining for them. 
The other represents an increase through the introduction of a detailed procedure for risk 
management. By applying a qualitative research methodology, we study how employees have 
interpreted corporate’s intentions behind the two formalisations. Further, we compare how this 
has influenced their experience of the MCS in the different cases.  
Overall, our conclusions support the argument made by Adler & Borys (1996) through 
revealing that how the increased and decreased formalisations in Statoil have been interpreted 
has been a consequence of their inherent features. We find that corporate have designed and 
implemented enabling formalisations that have had a positive attitudinal influence on the 
users. Further, our study suggests that generating an understanding of the underlying rationales 
behind the formalisations is of particular importance in this process. Finally, we also find that 
the contradictory degrees of formalisation have induced different interpretations of support 
roles in the MCS. Where they are regarded as an interference to decision-making latitude in 
the case of decreased formalisations, support roles are viewed as a positive feature in the case 
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1. Introduction 
This chapter elaborates on the background of our study, and its relevance for our case company 
Statoil AS before revealing its theoretical contribution. Further, we discuss our research 
question before presenting the thesis is organised.   
 
1.1 Report Background  
Deci and Ryan (1987) point to several studies that argue that factors such as rewards, threats 
and deadlines, evaluation and surveillance and the encouragement of choice by one’s 
surroundings, all have a substantial effect on a person’s sense of operating in an autonomous 
or a controlling environment. Formalisation encompasses the extent to which written rules, 
procedures and instructions are present and are therefore thought to have substantial attitudinal 
effects on its employees (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
Management Control Systems (MCS) incorporate the systems, rules, values and practices an 
organisation initiates to direct employee behaviour (Malmi & Brown, 2008). In other words, 
there is a link between the formalisations in place and the interpretation of the MCS.  
Traditionally, an increase in the degree of written rules and standardisation of procedures 
implies control within the organisation and a negative employee interpretation of the MCS 
(Burns & Stalker, 1969). Conversely, a decrease is thought to result in more autonomy 
amongst employees and a positive interpretation of the MCS. Burns & Stalker refer to this 
respectively as mechanistic and organic control. However, Adler & Borys (1996) broke with 
this dichotomous notion by arguing that it is not the degree of formalisation as such that 
influences how employees interpret the MCS, but the distinctive features of how rules and 
procedures are designed and implemented. Where enabling formalisation is structured and 
presented in a way that empowers employees to deal with both predictable and unpredictable 
contingencies in their work, coercive formalisation emphasises control and strict procedures.  
From our elaboration, we understand that the way an organisation designs and implements the 
formalisation of rules, procedures and instructions will influence how the MCS is interpreted 
and thus have an attitudinal impact on its members (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
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1.2 Relevance  
 
To reiterate, previously, researchers distinguished between two polar extremities in 
management systems (Burns & Stalker, 1969). On the one hand, managers could opt for a 
mechanistic and control based version where formal rules, standardised operational 
procedures and routines were in focus. The counterpart was an organic approach, with less 
focus on set structures and more attention devoted to fluidity and autonomy. 
Adler and Borys (1996) broke with the notion that the choice of management system should 
be based on the degree of formal rules and structures that exist. Instead, they argue that 
organisations can introduce MCS’s that imply both a mechanistic and organic approach. The 
fundamental question should not be how many rules and formal procedures that are in place, 
but their design. Adler and Borys argue that managers will meet positive reactions from their 
employees providing they introduce an enabling rather than a coercive design to formalisations 
in the MCS. Applying enabling structures also opens for variations in the degree of 
formalisations across the organisation.  
Adler and Borys (1996) have a highly theoretical approach to their analysis. Ahrens and 
Chapman (2004) attempted to apply the concepts of enabling and coercive formalisation in a 
more practical setting through a study of MCSs in a restaurant division. Although their 
research helps to develop a more complex understanding of the framework, it also calls for 
further field studies to achieve a greater appreciation of the concepts. In particular, they 
highlight that aspects of enabling formalisation appear coercive when applied in a more real-
life setting. By this, they imply that there is a need for further studies on how MCSs can 
formulate rules in an enabling manner.  
Wouters and Wilderom (2008) have also applied the concepts of enabling and coercive in a 
more practical setting. Their study of the development of performance management systems 
(PMS) in a logistics department helps to increase the understanding of how a PMS can take 
the shape of enabling formalisation. However, Wouters and Wilderom (2008)  also call for 
further studies on how organisations can implement different degrees of formalisation at the 
same time. Further research around this would increase the understanding of how MCSs 
simultaneously can support the objectives of efficiency and flexibility.   
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Previous research has acknowledged the usefulness of Adler and Borys’(1996) formalisation 
framework (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Our research builds on 
this theoretical concept, and at the same time tends to some of the concerns voiced through 
preceding studies. First of all, we aim to increase the understanding of what determines 
whether an MCS is perceived to constitute enabling or coercive formalisation. Secondly, our 
study expands on the notion that companies can vary the degree of formalisation within 
different parts of the organisation. In other words, one should not be surprised to find 
contradictory formalisations in one and the same company.  
Our empirical setting is that of the Norwegian multinational corporation (MNC), Statoil, that 
has recently introduced what may be regarded as two contradictory formalisations to their 
MCS. The contradiction lies in that the one formalisation – MS Roadmap – is designed to 
reduce the degree of formalisation. The other formalisation – RM 100 – is a new process for 
risk management containing detailed rules for how to deal with risk and therefore represents 
an increase in the degree of formalisation. In this thesis, we have a particular focus on how the 













1.3 Research question 
We ask the following main research question:  
How does the introduction of two contradictory formalisations influence the users’ 
interpretation of the Management Control System in an organisation?  
In order to answer this question, we ask two more sub-questions: 
1. What influence does decreased formalisation have on how the users interpret the 
Management Control System? 
 
2.  What influence does increased formalisation have on how the users interpret the 
Management Control System? 
 
This study makes two main contributions to literature. First of all, we have conducted a case 
study of an MNC which has recently made substantial and contradictory changes to its MCS. 
Secondly, we contribute to a further application of Adler & Borys’(1996) framework in line 
with requests from previous researchers. (Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008).  
 
1.4 Organisation of the paper  
The remainder of this thesis is organised into seven different chapters. Chapter Two introduces 
our theoretical foundation while Chapter Three explains the methodology we have applied in 
this thesis as well as discussing the reliability and validity of the study. Chapter Four 
establishes the background of our case-study organisation Statoil. Chapter Five reveals, 
through in-depth interviews, how Statoil has designed these two different degrees of 
formalisation, how it has carried out the implementation of the two and how the users of the 
MCS interpreted these efforts. Chapter Six analyses and discusses the findings in light of our 
theoretical perspective from chapter two. Finally, Chapter Seven contributes concluding 
remarks, summarises the study’s main findings and makes suggestions for future research.  
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2. Theory  
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate on the theoretical perspectives that form the basis 
for our analysis. Firstly, we introduce the concept of Management Control Systems, followed 
by a presentation of the framework we will apply when analysing formalisation in an 
organisation. Lastly, we summarise our theoretical perspective in a conceptual model which 
will be applied when approaching our underlying research question. 
2.1 Management Control Systems  
To answer our research question regarding how the introduction of two contradictory 
formalisations in the Management Control System (MCS) are interpreted and used in an 
organisation, we find it useful to define the relationship between MCSs and formalisation. 
Therefore, we will firstly aim to gain a clearer understanding of what an MCS consists of, 
before outlining how and where the concept of formalisation is introduced. Defining the 
relationship will give us a useful picture as to what extent they are interdependent.  
Management Control System - Definition 
There exist several different definitions of MCSs, some overlapping and some unique 
(Chenhall, 2003; Flamholtz, Das, & Tsui, 1985; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2007). The variation in definitions creates confusion in regards to interpreting research 
results and the design of MCSs (Malmi & Brown, 2008). It is, therefore, useful to study some 
of the different, extant definitions at hand before indicating the one that we will apply in our 
thesis.  
Some definitions encompass quite a broad description of the MCS. An example of this is 
Chenhall (2003)  who refers to Management Accounting (MA) systems as  
“A collection of practices such as budgeting or product costing,” Management Accounting 
Systems (MAS) as “the systematic use of MA to achieve some goal,” and then finally MCS as 
“a broader term that encompasses MAS and also includes other controls such as personal or 
clan controls,” (Chenhall, 2003, p.129). According to this definition, MCS are to be 
understood as any form of governing control within the organisation.  
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Merchant and Van Der Stede (2007) represent a narrower view on the role of an MCS: 
“Management controls are necessary to guard against the possibilities that people will do 
something the organisation does not want them to do or fail to do something they should do,” 
(Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007, p.8). In others words, they perceive the MCS more as the 
company’s enforcer rather than a fully scaled system as described by Chenhall (2003).  
Another interpretation of the role of the MCS is that of Flamholtz et. al (1985). They regard it 
to be “techniques and processes to achieve goal congruence which may be designed for all 
levels of behavioural influence: individuals, small groups, formal subunits and the 
organisational as a whole” (Flamholtz et al., 1985, p.36). This definition reflects upon the 
fact that employees at different levels may have other personal goals than that of the 
organisation as a whole. The MCS can in these cases act as assembling entity ensuring 
necessary goal congruence.  
Malmi and Brown (2008) argue that MCSs must be studied as a package phenomenon as 
opposed to several single components. They define MCSs as:  
“Those systems, rules, practices, values and other activities management put in place in order 
to direct employee behaviour should be called management controls. If these are complete 
systems, as opposed to a simple rule, then they should be called management control systems” 
(Malmi & Brown, 2008, p.290). 
On the surface, this definition includes similar features to those of the three previously 
discussed in the chapter (Chenhall, 2003; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Merchant & Van der Stede, 
2007). Further, similar to Chenhall (2003), it has quite a broad focus, including a wide range 
of organisational features. However, Malmi and Brown (2008) underline that the definition 
excludes pure decision-support systems, meaning systems within an organisation that are there 
to provide information to support decision-making. This excludes certain accounting systems 
that are designed solely for that purpose. 
Further, Malmi and Brown (2008) underline that the focus is on all the devices and systems 
managers use to ensure that the behaviours and decisions of employees are in line with the 
organisation's objectives and strategies. In other words, it includes a similar emphasis on 
behavioural control as Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2007) definition as well as the attention 
to goal congruence advocated by Flamholtz et. al (1985).  
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However, where Malmi and Brown’s (2008) definition fundamentally distinguishes itself from 
the others discussed so far, is through its focus on studying MCS as a package. Their definition 
implies that different elements in the MCS should not be regard as isolated from one another. 
This view is supported by Chenhall (2003) who proclaims that although many researchers 
consider MCS as a series of unique themes and practices that are independent of each other 
and their surroundings, they invariably sit within a broader control system. Fisher (1998) goes 
as far as stating that not acknowledging MCSs as a package means disregarding the links that 
exist between its different features. This will lead to erroneous conclusions when studying 
how MCS components relate to contingent variables.  
This thesis will apply Malmi and Brown's (2008) definition of an MCS. By doing so, we 
appreciate the need for a broad definition which focuses on behavioural control, goal 
congruence and that acknowledges the need for studying MCS as a package. In relation to our 
previous discussion around formalisation, the definition implies that the balance between 
control and autonomy is influenced directly by the MCS in place.   
Describing the Management Control System Package  
With this definition in mind, Malmi and Brown (2008) go a step further by providing us with 
a conceptual typology of what an MCS consists of. To gain a deeper understanding of how the 
MCS influences formalisation, we will now introduce the different aspects of the typology. 
Malmi and Brown (2008) describe five types of control through their framework. 
 
Planning control  
Flamholtz et. al. (1985) refer to this as an ex-ante form of control. Firstly, it controls behaviour 
and directs effort amongst the active parts of the organisation (Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
Secondly, planning control sets the necessary standards required to achieve the goal. Finally, 
it stimulates goal congruence by having aligned goals across the organisation. One 
distinguishes between plans for the immediate future that have a tactical intention and long-
term plans which have a more strategic focus.  
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Cybernetic controls  
Malmi and Brown (2008) turn to the following definition by Green and Welsh’s (Green & 
Welsh, 1988) when elaborating on cybernetic control:  “A process in which a feedback loop 
is represented by using standards of performance, measuring system performance, comparing 
that performance to standards, feeding back information about unwanted variances in the 
system, and modifying the system’s comportment” (Green & Welsh, 1988, p.289). The 
typology includes four basic forms of cybernetic control: Budgets, Financial Measurement 
Systems, Non-Financial Measurement Systems and hybrids of Financial and Non-Finacial 
measurement systems such as the balanced scorecard (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
Reward and compensation controls 
Through attaching rewards and compensation to the performance of the individual employee 
or group, the MCS control effort direction, duration and intensity (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
Administrative controls 
Administrative controls direct employee behaviour through the organisation of individuals or 
groups, the monitoring of employee behaviour and who they are made accountable to and 
through specifying how tasks and actions are to be performed, or not performed (Malmi & 
Brown, 2008). The typology includes the following three groups of administrative controls: 
Governance Structure, Organisation Structure and Policies and Procedures.  
Cultural Controls 
Malmi and Brown (2008) draw on research on organisational culture when defining cultural 
controls. They grant that culture exists as a context for the organisation and often beyond 
managerial control. However, it can also be used as a form of control when consciously used 
to dictate employee behaviour. Flamholtz et. al. (1985) define it as: “the set of values, beliefs 
and social norms which tend to be shared by its members and, in turn, influence their thoughts 
and actions” (Flamholtz et al., 1985, p.158). The typology refers to the culture controls: clan 





Figure 1: Management Control System Package overview (Malmi and 
Brown, 2008) 
 
Figure 1 provides a useful overview of the MCS packages, as well as the different links that 
exist within. Cultural controls are at the top of the figure to indicate their position as broad, 
yet subtle controls (Malmi & Brown, 2008).  They are also thought to be slow in change, 
providing a contextual frame for the other controls in the package. Planning, Cybernetic and 
Reward and Compensation controls are perceived as tightly linked in many organisations and 
are therefore placed in the middle in a temporal order. Administrative controls reserve their 
place at the bottom as the factor which provides the structure of which the three components 
above operate within.  
Focusing on Administrative Controls 
Our chosen definition of the MCS concept is, as previously emphasised, of an extensive nature. 
On the one hand, this means that it covers a broad scope of organisational features and is 
therefore of substantial explanatory value. However, as a consequence, a wide definition as 
such risks losing depth in regards to the different controls that exist in the MCS. When we 
later engage in an empirical study of Statoil ASA our focus will be on formalisation in the 
organisation's Administrative Controls. More specifically, the implementation of the new 
process for risk management focuses on the Policies and Procedures part of the MCS while 
the introduced structural change applies to an adjustment made to the Governance Structure 
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as well as to Policies and Procedures. Clarifying which parts of Statoil ASA's MCS we will 
be analysing allows as to conduct a more in-depth study of the underlying alterations that have 
been conducted.  
The relationship between formalisation and the Management Control 
System 
The purpose of this elaboration on MCS was to establish a clearer understanding of the 
relationship between MCSs and formalisation. Malmi and Brown’s (2008) definition implies 
that balancing control and autonomy is a central feature in the MCS. Furthermore, their 
typology displays formalisation’s fundamental role throughout the MCS package. Whether it 
is contextual through cultural controls, on an operational level through planning, cybernetic 
and reward and compensation controls or on a structural basis through administrative controls, 
the type and degree of formalisation is consistently an important and deciding factor for how 
the MCS is interpreted by employees.  
2.2 Formalisation  
Now that we have established the importance of formalisation in the MCS, we continue with 
elaborating on the theoretical framework that we will apply when studying formalisation in an 
organisation. The foundations of our theory will rest on the framework presented by Adler & 
Borys in their article from 1996; Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive. In this 
paper, they propose "a conceptualisation of workflow formalisation that helps reconcile the 
contrasting assessments of bureaucracy as alienating to employees or as enabling them to 
perform their tasks better" (Adler & Borys, 1996, p.61). This framework overcomes the 
conventional assumption that formalisation is a necessary evil and must be reduced to achieve 
high motivation. Further, it allows for a more balanced view compared to the standard 
dichotomous view of enabling vs. coercive. 
According to Adler & Borys (1996), there exist two types of formalisation; enabling and 
coercive. Coercive formalisation generates a negative attitude from employees by seeking to 
force compliance. Further, it entails a deskilling approach where users are solely expected to 
follow present rules and instructions to the point. In contrast, enabling formalisation facilitates 
a positive attitude and leads to the employees feeling motivated by the rules and systems in 
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place. In this case, there exists a usability approach whereby users are encouraged to combine 
the rules and instructions with their own capabilities when conducting a procedure.    
Four generic features  
Adler & Borys (1996) point towards four generic features that distinguish deskilling from 
usability approaches: repair, internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility. They 
argue that the design of formalisations in relation to these four features will ultimately 
determine whether the users interpret it as enabling or coercive.  
Repair 
The first feature is repair. According to Adler & Borys (1996), some systems are designed so 
that the employees can act and repair when contingencies occur, while others are designed so 
that the “inner workings” are hidden and impossible for them to repair without asking for help 
from their superiors. In systems like these, those who repair the system are separated from 
those who use the system. A coercive procedure system is created with the intent to highlight 
to superiors whenever there is a deviation from standard procedure. From the employees’ point 
of view, such an arrangement is experienced as a way for management to cover their backs.   
An enabling design allows the employee to respond to real-life contingencies. Adler & Borys 
(1996) argue that a characteristic of enabling designs is “the ease of which users, i.e., 
employees, can repair the process themselves rather than allowing the breakdown to force the 
work process to a halt” (Adler & Borys, 1996, p.70). In the case of a control system, this can 
mean, for example, that managers have the permission and ability to modify the definition and 
measurement of performance indicators if this is seen as more fitting (Wouters & Wilderom, 
2008).  
Internal Transparency 
The second generic feature, internal transparency, refers to the employees’ knowledge of the 
logic of the system as well as the status (Adler & Borys, 1996). A deskilling approach does 
not give the employee insight into the system until there is a malfunction, thus it has a 
significant emphasis on sanctions and punishments in case of deviations rather than helping 
and guiding the employees.  
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An enabling design, on the other hand, gives the users an insight into the system as well as 
guiding them by communicating best practice. Ahrens & Chapman (2004) argue that target 
values should be communicated to managers if the system is to be transparent. Best-practice 
is also used to offer the user feedback on their performance against historical standards. Adler 
& Borys (1996) argue that this can lead to positive competition amongst users as they would 
want to develop the new “best-practice” in use.  
Global Transparency 
Global Transparency refers to how well the employee knows the context and organisational 
strategy. In coercive systems, this is viewed as a risk. An example is organisations where you 
only get to see your own budget, while budgets for other departments remain secret (Ahrens 
& Chapman, 2004). An enabling design, on the other hand, shares information about other 
departments key goals or other useful information recognising that this can be helpful to the 
employees. 
Flexibility  
Flexibility refers to the degree to which the employees can deviate from steps in procedures 
or make changes without the need to contact a supervisor for approval (Adler & Borys, 1996). 
Typically, a coercive design explains the steps of a procedure in a detailed manner, allowing 
no deviations unless it is authorised by a supervisor. Enabling procedures, on the other hand, 
incorporate deviations as possibilities to learn and improve. The view is that deviating from 
the standard procedure and skipping mandatory steps can be safe in certain situations. Thus, 
the system in place should have procedures and guidelines facilitating skipping when needed. 
Breaking with the conventional assumption 
In their article, Adler & Borys (1996) break with the conventional assumption first presented 
by Burns & Stalker (1969) where formalisation is regarded as inherently negative and thus 
must be reduced to achieve high motivation. Instead, they claim that how employees interpret 
a formalisation depends on whether the rules and systems in place are designed to be enabling 
or coercive in regards to the four generic features. Hence, Adler & Borys (1996) argue that it 
is not the degree of formalisation that decides whether it will be well-received or not, but the 
way it is designed and implemented. This implies that both a high and low degree of 
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formalisation can potentially generate positive or negative attitudes from employees, 
depending on the type of formalisation.  
The two-dimensional framework 
Building on the four generic features and their impact on how formalisation is interpreted, 
Adler & Borys (1996) have developed a two-dimensional framework “...as a way to theorise 
the difference between good and bad procedures as experienced by employees” (Adler & 
Borys, 1996, p.77): 
 
 
Figure 2: Adler & Borys’ two-dimensional framework (Adler & Borys, 1996, 
page 78) 
The framework’s first dimension concerns the degree of formalisation that the procedure 
represents, while the second describes whether it is designed as enabling or coercive in relation 
to the four generic features. Depending on how the formalisation is located in terms of the two 
dimensions, Adler & Borys (1996) argue that employees will interpret the organisation as 
either: Organic, Enabling Bureaucracy, Autocratic or Mechanistic. The first two will be well-
received by employees while the last two will promote a negative attitude.  
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Through the two-dimensional framework, Adler & Borys  (1996) also open for the possibility 
of organisations operating with a mix of routine and nonroutine tasks. Previously, such 
situations have been thought to create an organisational design dilemma. It has been assumed 
that it is highly problematic to have routine process that are mechanistic and/or coercive, and 
to expose the same employees to nonroutine processes that are managed in an organic and 
empowering way. Adler & Borys  (1996) argue that even organisations whose core tasks are 
essentially routine can mix organic and enabling-bureaucratic features, enabling workers to 
switch between production tasks and quality-circle activity. This is consistent with Ahrens & 
Chapman (2004), who, by studying the management control systems in a Restaurant Division, 
found that processes of coercive formalisation existed side by side with processes of enabling 
formalisation.  
The role of involvement  
Adler & Borys (1996) argue that the degree to which a formalisation is interpreted as enabling 
or coercive can be strengthened by how it is implemented by management. Hence, a successful 
implementation process can increase the employees’ positive attitude towards the 
formalisation, while a negative experience is likely to be induced in the case of the opposite. 
They underline the importance of the implementation process by stating that a formalisation 
that is regarded as enabling by those who designed it can be implemented in a coercive way. 
One of the factors that Adler & Borys (1996) believe will lead to a successful implementation 
process, and therefore a positive attitudinal outcome, is the involvement of employees in the 
formulation process of a procedure. This is consistent with March (1994) who found that when 
introducing a new technology, or changing a standard operating procedure, those who 
participated in the decision are more likely to have a positive attitude towards the change than 
those who did not participate.  
Wouters & Wilderom (2008) build on Adler & Borys' (1996) concept of involvement of 
employees in the formalisation process through a study on the design and implementation-
phase of a performance measurement system (PMS). They look at the development process of 
a PMS and how it affects the employees’ perception of the PMS as enabling. They propose 
that a PMS is likely to be viewed as enabling if the employees characterise the development 
process as experienced-based. They also highlight allowing employees to participate in 
experimentations of the PMS as another important factor. Linking this to Adler & Borys’ 
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(1996) internal transparency feature, Wouters & Wilderom (2008) seem to agree that 
involvement in the development process and a clear insight into the rationales behind the 
procedure will likely lead to a more positive attitude towards a new procedure.  
In addition, Wouters & Wilderom (2008) propose that building on existing, local experience 
is an important characteristic of enabling PMS development. A development process will 
successfully stimulate enabling formalisation when it fully acknowledges, respects, and 
utilises the intellectual capital of lower-level employees' existing practices of and insights in 
performance measurement. This opposes to the conventional development process which is 
usually characterised as very top-down (Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). In this case, 
management firstly define the overall strategic objectives clearly and secondly consider the 
local operations' specific contribution toward achieving these overall strategic objectives 
(Wouters & Wilderom, 2008).  
Further, Wouters & Wilderom (2008) argue that the development process should involve 
employees in an experimentation phase to be perceived as enabling. The performance 
measures are not likely to be right the first time; thus, the process should involve employees 
in experimentation and testing as they are the ones who are best placed to judge that their work 
efforts are validly or invalidly reflected in the performance measures. 
Wouters & Wilderom’s (2008) results are consistent with those of Glew et al. (1995) who find 
that participation in change processes affect satisfaction with the process, outcomes and 
acceptance. 
Other factors that may have attitudinal effect 
While our analysis will be confined to Adler & Borys’ (1996) four generic features and to the 
role of involvement, we now present a short overview of other features that have been 
considered to have attitudinal effect on employees.  
Adler & Borys (1996) identify goal congruence as a critical contingency in regards to securing 
a positive attitude towards a formulisation. An employee who have good knowledge of the 
organisational goals is less likely to interpret formal procedures as a breach of individual 
autonomy.  
Adler & Borys (1996) also argue that asymmetries of power in the organisation, asymmetries 
in the distribution of resources and institutionalised employee voice can encourage a coercive 
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logic. March  (1994) support this view by highlighting hierarchy as a feature that imposes 
differences in power. According to Adler & Borys (1996), uneven distribution of power in an 
organisation will encourage a coercive logic as it is easier for people in higher positions to 
deflect responsibility for negative outcomes downwards in the hierarchy.  
Further, Adler & Borys (1996) state that an absence of what they call a “reality check” will 
lead to a more coercive logic. A lack of competition and external influence can reduce the 
incentives for improvement and thus lead firms to focus on itself instead, focusing on coercive 
bureaucracy and increasing the risk for internal conflicts.  
Finally, Jordan & Messner (2012) and Wouters & Wilderom (2008) have debated to what 
degree management’s handling of performance indicators have attitudinal effects on 
employees. Performance indicators are used in many organisations to control and facilitate 
managers’ decisions and actions. Drawing upon the framework of Adler & Borys (1996), 
Jordan & Messner (2012) look at the extent to which managers actually care about the design 
characteristics of such performance indicators. Where Wouters & Wilderom (2008) argue that 
employees who regard the performance indicators as incomplete may lead to a perception of 
the management control system as coercive, Jordan & Messner (2012) find that such 
incompleteness does not necessarily create a “problem” in the eyes of managers. As long as a 
flexible handling of the control system is possible, such a system can still be regarded as 
enabling. Further, they argue that the perception of a system can change over time. Top 
management can make small changes given the reaction of middle managers and employees. 
It is also possible that middle-management and employees can grow fond of a system as they 







2.3 Conceptual framework  
We have summarised our theoretical approach in this thesis in the following conceptual 
framework. Above all, it suggests that both increased and decreased formalisation can be 



















Figure 3: Conceptual Framework 
 
The left-hand side of the framework represents the degree of formalisation that management 
chooses for the formalisation in question. In this thesis, we will be analysing Statoil’s 
implementation of two administrative controls; one increase in formalisation and one decrease.  
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In phase two, management must choose how the formalisation should be designed. We will 
be analysing how the two formalisations have been designed in relation to the four generic 
features presented by Adler & Borys (1996). The analysis will uncover whether the 
formalisations introduced by Statoil entails an enabling or coercive design which again 
influences how the users interpret the organisation’s MCS. Note that we suggest the possibility 
for an iterative interaction between the four generic features and the two degrees of 
formalisation. This is because where some firms will short-circuit this relationship early, 
others will experience longer processes when designing formalisations. 
As argued by several researchers, the degree to which a formalisation is interpreted as enabling 
or coercive can be, if present, strengthened by the involvement of employees in the 
formulation process of a procedure (Adler & Borys, 1996; March, 1994; Wouters & 
Wilderom, 2008).  
Finally, if the formalisaiton incorprates an enabling design, the users will view it as either 
Enabling burraucry or Organic, depending on the degree of formalisation. In the case of the 
opposite, the users will experience the MCS in the organisation as Mechanistic or Autocratic.  
As the reader will notice, we will be comparing managerial intentions and user interpretations 
throughout our analysis.  
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3. Methodology  
The purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the methodological approach when 
conducting our research procedure.  
First of all, it is important to note that we have chosen a top-down approach when answering 
our overall research question. This means that we have looked at the changes made to our 
case-study organisation’s (MCS) from the corporate division’s perspective. Hence, we have 
been interested in studying what corporate intentions were behind the changes made, and then 
how the users of the MCS have interpreted them.  
When planning our research process, we observed that there are numerous ways of conducting 
it. By elaborating on our different choices, we aim to display the rationales behind the 
methodology in this thesis.  
3.1 Research philosophy, design and approach 
There are a number of choices that need to be made before designing an overall research 
strategy.  
Research philosophy  
The research philosophy refers to the researcher’s belief system and assumptions regarding 
how knowledge is developed (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016). Whether it is a conscious 
choice or not, the research philosophy is thought to reflect our view of the world. This will 
again affect how we understand our research question as well as the methods chosen in order 
to explore it.   
Saunders et al. (2016) distinguish between three different research philosophies: Ontology, 
Epistemology and Axiology. A researcher with an ontological approach is absorbed by 
assumptions regarding the nature of reality. Hence, he or she will be trying to understand the 
reality of what emerges when exploring the research question. An epistemological philosophy 
questions the knowledge that appears when researching a subject. This is done through critical 
thinking about how we can know what we know and issues such as what knowledge should 
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be considered acceptable. Finally, an axiological approach focuses on being conscious about 
how the different research participants’ values affect the research process.  
Furthermore, Saunders et al. (2016) also distinguish between having an objective or subjective 
approach to the different research philosophies. An ontological objectivist argues that the 
social reality we observe through research is an entirely independent and external factor that 
is removed from any research participant. Those who are most extreme view social reality as 
physical entities that only have one truth to all the different social actors. Researchers with an 
epistemologically objective philosophy aim to discover the truth about the world through 
observations and facts. An objectivist generally believes that social entities and actors exist 
independently of each other. An axiological objectivist, therefore, tries to keep research free 
of values, which according to them can bias their findings. Staying detached from their own 
values is critical.   
On the hand, subjectivism believes that social reality is created by social actors to a greater or 
lesser extent (Saunders et al., 2016). Subjective ontological researchers will consider the 
outcome of a research process to be socially constructed by the different research participants, 
including the researcher. This is done through the language, interpretation and social concepts 
that are applied. There is also an acceptance of multiple realities. A subjective epistemological 
philosophy is concerned with opinions, attributed meanings and narratives through adopting 
assumptions of the arts and humanities. Furthermore, it focuses on trying to understand how 
different individuals and contexts cohere. Finally, subjective axiological researchers will 
acknowledge the fact that because they are actively reviewing and using the data retrieved 
from the research process, they cannot detach themselves from their values. They, therefore, 
spend time on openly reflecting and questioning their own values, which is also included as 
part of their research.  
Our research 
Our primary approach is to use Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework to explore how the two 
formalisations Statoil have introduced are interpreted by the users. Hence, we are applying an 
ontological philosophy. Our results aim to reflect the existing social reality. However, our 
choice of using interviews with Statoil employees in order disclose the matter implies a 
subjective approach. Hence, we believe social reality at Statoil to be constructed by the social 
actors. Because our research is also trying to uncover if there is any mismatch regarding what 
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was intended by those who introduced the new formalisations and those who apply them, we 
also accept that there may be multiple realities.  
Research design 
According to Saunders et al. (2016), one of the most important choices to be made when 
building a research strategy is whether to opt for a quantitative or qualitative methodology. 
One way of distinguishing the two is to look at whether the research is based on numeric or 
textual data (Williams, 2007). A quantitative research design focuses on examining the 
relationship between variables that a measured numerically by using a range of statistical and 
graphical techniques (Saunders et al., 2016). On the other hand, a qualitative research design 
focuses on textual data, on meanings and the relationship between them. This is done by using 
various data collection techniques and analytical processes to create a conceptual framework.  
Further, Saunders et al. (2016) encourage the researcher to be conscious of whether the 
research design aims to be of exploratory, descriptive or explanatory value. This is very much 
decided by how one goes about asking the different questions that are aimed to collect data to 
answer the overall problem statement. An exploratory study is a flexible approach that allows 
one to alter the direction of the research procedure as new data appears. There is a focus on 
asking open questions aiming to reveal what is happening and as well as the reasons behind it 
to clarify an understanding on an issue or a problem.  
A descriptive approach requires that one is well-informed in advance in regards to the 
phenomenon that you wish to collect data on (Saunders et al., 2016). The aim is to accurately 
convey events in their proper sequence, meaning the researcher must ask straight and 
unadorned questions in the process (Sandelowski, 2000). Finally, an explanatory study seeks 
to establish the casual relationship between different variables by studying them in specific 
situations (Saunders et al., 2016).  
Our research 
Our research aims to establish the opinions of both those who have implemented and received 
the two formalisations introduced in Statoil. We are interested in their in-depth experience of 
the situation and also wish to study the relationship between the different meanings. We, 
therefore, find it advantageous to apply a qualitative approach. Furthermore, the study will 
implement an exploratory approach to a research process. We believe that asking open 
 28
questions in our interview process will give the respondents an opportunity to speak more 
freely about their experience of the situation. This will hopefully provide us with an 
opportunity to gain a comprehensive understanding of their perception and responses to the 
adjustments that have been made by Statoil. We believe that the exploratory approach’s 
flexible nature will helpful because it will allow us to change the direction of the interview 
should anything unexpected be reviled during the interviews.  
Research Approach  
It is also necessary to decide upon an approach for drawing conclusions from the research data 
that the research strategy provides. Saunders et al. (2016) distinguish between three different 
approaches: deduction, induction and abduction.  
A deductive approach is concerned with drawing conclusions logically from a set of premises. 
The conclusion is thought to be true when the all the premises are true (Ketokivi & Mantere, 
2010). Research processes where the researcher starts with a theory developed from the 
reading of academic literature, before designing a research strategy to test the theory, is 
applying a deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2016).  
On the other side of the scale, an inductive approach looks to draw conclusions from empirical 
observations (Ketokivi & Mantere, 2010). Here, researchers focus on collecting data to explore 
a phenomenon and then move on to generating a theory or a conceptual framework (Saunders 
et al., 2016).  
Finally, an abductive approach is as a combination of the deductive and inductive approach. 
Conclusions are drawn from observations which then lay the foundation for a premises that 
partially or wholly explain the conclusion. Data is collected to explore a phenomenon, identify 
themes and explain patterns. Building on this, the researcher generates a new theory or 
develops an existing one through additional data collection (Saunders et al., 2016).  
Our research     
This thesis will be applying an abductive approach. Firstly, we collect data through reviewing 
internal Statoil documents and conducting interviews. This is done to explore the effects the 
introduction of the two formalisations have had on the organisation.  We then turn to theory 
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on management control systems, Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework and more recent 
research to develop a conceptual framework that can help us explain our observation.  
3.2 Research Strategy 
A research strategy is a plan for how the researcher will be answering the underlying research 
question and figures as a methodological link between the research philosophy and choice of 
methods for collecting data (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Many factors influence the selection 
of research strategy. However, Saunders et al. (2016) believe the most fundamental of these 
to be the research question and objectives, the research philosophy, approach and purpose, as 
well as pragmatic concerns such as the amount of available time and resources.  
In light of our research question and the choices that have made regarding our research 
philosophy, design and approach, we identified three suitable research strategies: ethnography, 
grounded theory and case studies. Ethnography focuses on describing and interpreting people 
in groups who interact with each other (Saunders et al., 2016). Furthermore, Saunders et al. 
(2016) explain that grounded theory “is used to develop theoretical explanations of social 
interactions and processes in a wide range of contexts” (Saunders et al., 2016, p.193). Thus, 
a researcher with this strategy aims to develop a theory grounded in the available data.  
A case study explores a phenomenon that is set within its natural context (Saunders et al., 
2016). Through insights from intensive, in-depth research within a real-life setting, case 
studies are thought to give the researcher rich and empirical descriptions that can lead to the 
development of theory(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). A case study can either be performed 
through studying a single case or multiple cases (Yin, 2014). A single case approach should 
be chosen when faced with a unique or extreme case, meaning that the researcher is studying 
a phenomenon few have considered before. A multiple case approach should be applied if the 
aim is generalisation and a possible replication of the different findings. Furthermore, a case 
study can either be a holistic or embedded case. Where the former observes the organisation 




This thesis will take a case study strategy to gain a rich understanding of the context in which 
the two formalisations have been introduced within. By conducting in-depth interviews and 
studying various Statoil internal documents we aim to uncover the realities behind how the 
implementation has affected the organisation. Furthermore, the case study will take the form 
of a single case study. The simultaneous introduction of the two formalisations is a unique 
case, meaning that few others have considered it before. Finally, we will be looking to study 
both how the two formalisations were intended and designed by Statoil’s corporate division, 
as well as how it has been perceived by the different users. Hence, we will be taking an 
embedded approach by choosing to study two sub-units as our way to a holistic impression of 
the situation at hand.  
3.3  Data collection 
Time horizon 
Saunders et al. (2016) distinguish between two-time horizons for the research process to be 
conducted within. A cross-section time horizon represents a “snapshot” taken at a specific 
point of time, while a longitudinal time horizon focuses on representing a series of events over 
a given period. Our research will be conducted within a cross-sectional time horizon through 
interviews over a short period. Naturally, the time frame for our thesis plays a major role in 
this choice. However, this approach is also interesting because it allows us to focus on studying 
the different interpretations that exist of the two formalisations close to when they were 
implemented.  
Selecting samples 
Defining the population  
Before initiating the data collection process, the researcher must define a population that will 
make it possible to answer the overall research question (Saunders et al., 2016). Due to 
constraints on time, access and resources, it might be necessary to target a subset of the 
population. This is called a target population and becomes the actual focus of the overall 
research inquiry. To narrow down the whole process to make it more manageable, researchers 
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have the opportunity of choosing a sample that can be used to infer something about the target 
population. It is important to keep in mind that the underlying goal of the research process is 
to answer the research question (Saunders et al., 2016). The target population and sample must, 
therefore, be chosen in a way that ensures that this is still possible.  
Considering our overall research question, our population can be defined as any organisation 
introducing two contradictory formalisations. Naturally, we found it necessary to narrow the 
process down by focusing on a specific part of this population. We, therefore, chose Statoil 
and those directly involved in and affected by, the changes that have been made as our target 
population. Furthermore, in cooperation with our thesis supervisor and representatives from 
Statoil, we identified a sample of respondents who were believed to be capable of giving us 
those insights that could help answer our overall research question. All in all, the aim is that 
the chosen sample of respondents will be able to infer something about the introduction of two 
contradictory formalisations in Statoil. Ultimately, our thesis intends to be of value for any 
organisation confronted by similar pressures to those faced by Statoil.   
Probability vs. Non-probability sampling 
The selection of respondents from the target population can either be done through probability 
or non-probability sampling (Saunders et al., 2016). The probability technique provides 
information on the likelihood of someone in the sample being chosen from the target group. 
Hence, one can statistically determine to what degree the interviewee can infer something 
about the population. This is not the case for non-probability sampling, although one may still 
be able to generalise about the population given (Sanders et al., 2016). 
This thesis is based on a non-probability sampling. Our aim was to develop an in-depth 
understanding of our research topic, rather than to draw statistical generalisations. We focused 
on getting many different insights on the subject rather than to maximise statistical inference 
to acquire a holistic view.  
Sample size  
There are no rules regarding the size of the sample when using a non-probability sampling 
according to Saunders et al. (2016). Instead, it is important to strive for a sufficiently logical 
connection between the sample and the research question. Consequently, Patton (2002) states 
that the sample size should be dependent on the research question as well as an evaluation of 
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what is thought to be useful, credible and possible to be done within the available resources. 
It is of particular importance to be aware of these factors when conducting structured or semi-
structured interviews. 
The appropriateness of our sample size is discussed in the internal validity-section.  
Sampling technique  
The sampling technique refers to how one goes about choosing the specific sample of 
respondents (Saunders et al., 2016). There are different techniques within non-probability 
sampling ranging from quota sampling where the sample tries to represent the whole 
population, to haphazard sampling answers to the need of obtaining samples quickly and 
which leads to little control over the selected sample. This thesis will apply a purposive 
sampling technique, which requires the researcher to purposefully choose the sample which 
will help answer the research question in the best possible way (Saunders et al., 2016). The 
technique is thought to be useful when working with smaller samples such as in case studies 
(Neuman, 2005).  
Our sample was selected in cooperation with our thesis supervisor and our contact person in 
Statoil. After clarifying the objectives of our study, our supervisor, Katarina Kaarbøe, initiated 
the initial contact with Statoil. As a result of this process, Statoil requested a study of two 
recent changes that the company had made to its Management Control System (MCS). We 
were then provided with a contact person by Statoil, who invited us to corporate headquarters 
in Stavanger to discuss what could be the best approach. For the same day, he also set up 
meetings with the members of Statoil’s corporate body that had been responsible for designing 
and implementing the two changes to the MCS. As a result of the discussions, our contact 
person cooperated with a member of Statoil’s Development and Production International 
(DPI) team and set up interviews with five country managers, four function members and two 
more members of the teams that had been part of the design and implementation team.  
Our top-down approach made it important for us to interview both members of the different 
teams that had been involved in designing and implementing the two changes to the MCS, as 
well as employees that are now obliged to comply with the new systems.  
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The sample 
We will now give a detailed guide of the sample of respondents that we have been given access 
to when conducting our study. Note that it will be highly useful for the reader to have an 
overview of the sample at hand when going through our empirical findings in Chapter 5 and 




Our sample consists of 14 different Statoil-employees. To preserve participant anonymity, 
which is discussed section 3.4, we have placed the respondents into four different employee 
groups. Two of the groups represent the corporate body that has been involved in the design 
process of RM100, while the other two contains employees who have been affected by the 
changes made to the Management Control System (MCS).  
Group 1: Three members of the corporate risk team 
The members represent different parts of Statoil’s corporate body, which is presented in figure 
4. They were responsible for designing and implementing the increased formalisation that we 
later refer to as RM100.  
Figure 4: Organisation Chart (Statoil f, 2016) 
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Group 2: Two members of the corporate operational staff 
The members of this group were responsible for designing and implementing the decreased 
formalisation which is later referred to as MS Roadmap. In Statoil, they sit as part of a team 
that supports the Chief Operating Officer, Anders Oppedal (see figure 4).  
Group 3: Four people from the function.  
The function people are also part of Anders Oppedal’s Chief Operating Officer (COO) group 
(see figures 4). However, they operate in different parts of the organisation as discipline 
experts to assist and give advice on issues that relate to their fields of expertise. The people 
from the function that we interviewed sit within Statoil’s DPI division (see figure 5) which is 
headed by Lars Christian Bacher (see figure 4), but they formally answer to the COO.   
 
 
Figure 5: DPI Organisational Chart (Jan Helge Skogen, 2016) 
Group 4: Five country managers  
The country managers are legally responsible for all operations in their respective countries 
and represent employees that must now comply with the changes made to the organisations 
MCS. They are part of Statoil’s DPI division which is headed by Lars Christian Bacher (see 
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figure 4). Figure 5 provides an overview of how DPI is organised and further where the country 
managers sit within the division. 
Note: For the sake of simplicity, we will sometimes use the term “Supporting Roles”. This 
term refers to roles such as the Corporate Operating Organisation (COO), people from the 
function and HR-related groups.    
Interviews 
It is normal to distinguish between two different types of data sources, primary and secondary 
sources (Saunders et al., 2016). Primary sources represent data that is collected directly from 
the source specifically for the research project, while a secondary source is data that was 
originally produced for other purposes. This thesis uses secondary sources in the form of 
internal Statoil documents. Some documents have been provided to us by our contact person, 
and some of the data is available online. They have all been used to generate an understanding 
of Statoil’s management control system and the changes they have made to it. The backbone 
of this thesis’ research though is built upon primary sources generated from interviews.  
Yin (2014) acknowledges interviews as an imperative source of information when conducting 
case-studies. Saunders et al. (2016) distinguish between three main types of interviews with 
based on their structure: structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Structured 
interviews rely on a standardised interview format and a pre-defined set of questions. Where 
this interview-type is usually used for quantitative studies, the last two are often preferred for 
qualitative research processes. In semi-structured interviews, the interviewers have certain 
themes and key questions that they wish to cover. The focus is on designing an interview 
process where the interviewee elaborates around these and also on asking additional questions 
to ensure that the objectives for the interviews are met. Unstructured interviews where the aim 
is to get the respondent to elaborate freely on event, behaviour and beliefs in regards to a 
specific topic.  
Our research  
Our interviews were based upon semi-structured interviews as we regarded this as the most 
effective way to meet the objectives of our interview process. Before conducting the 
interviews, we developed an interview guide that defined some topics and key questions that 
we wished to cover. This helped ensure that the interviews provided the necessary information 
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needed for our research. Overall, though, our focus was on getting the interviewees to tell the 
story of how they experience and interpret the changes made to Statoil’s management control 
system. Furthermore, asking follow-up questions allowed us to keep on track and to extract 
detailed information.  
Conducting the interviews 
Before the interviews, we spent time studying relevant theory and the secondary sources that 
we had been given access to. This helped us to develop a relevant interview guide. It also 
ensured that we could discuss our research topic at a detailed enough level with our 
interviewees. Before starting the interviews, we informed the respondents about the consent 
form we had signed that ensured their anonymity. We also asked permission to audio record 
the proceedings. This allowed us to maintain a fluent interview process. In combination with 
the following transcriptions, it also secured the necessary information and quotation accuracy.  
Although we interviewed employees who are stationed in different parts of Norway, but also 
in various locations around the world, we were able to conduct most of the interviews face-to-
face. Two of the interviews were held using Statoil’s video conference facilities. Although 
there is always a concern that this will lead to the loss of contextual information like body-
language and facial expressions, we experienced that the equipment used was of a high 
standard. Hence, we do not believe that video conferences were significantly inferior to face-
to-face interviews. The interviews were conducted in either Norwegian and English according 
to what was most beneficial for securing a fluent interview process.  
Analysing the data 
After conducting the interviews, we proceeded to transcribe the different audio recordings. 
We then used the information to conduct a template analysis that aimed to categorise the 
collected data into different themes and look at the relationship between them. Some of the 
categories like repair, internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility were pre-
defined in accordance with our chosen theory, while new categories also appeared as a result 
of the information given to us by the respondents. Next to the material we received through 
the secondary sources, we continued to analyse, compare and categorise the interviews until 
we were able to draw conclusions.   
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3.4 Evaluating the chosen methodology  
Two dominant factors prevail when evaluating the quality of chosen methodology: the study’s 
reliability and validity.  
Reliability  
Reliability refers to the consistency of the study (Saunders et al., 2016). A study is thought to 
be reliable if a researcher can yield the same findings from replicating a research design (Yin, 
2014). Saunders et al. (2016) point towards four threats to reliability: participant error, 
participant bias, researcher error and researcher.  
Participant error 
Participant error refers to any factors that might have affected how the respondents perform 
(Saunders et al., 2016). All of the interviews were voluntary and conducted on the 
interviewee’s terms in regards to both time and location. Hence, there is likely to have been 
little interference from factors connected to their normal work duties. Having said that, this 
study provides a snapshot of how the two formalisations are interpreted while they are still 
relatively new to the organisation. Hence, it would be interesting to replicate the study when 
the changes to the management control system are more ingrained.   
Participant bias 
Participant bias concerns any factors that might induce false response from the respondents 
(Saunders et al., 2016). This study is conducted on behalf of Statoil’s corporate leadership, 
and the interviews were initially organised through our contact person in Statoil who is part of 
Statoil’s COO-function. The fact that the interviewees know that the outcome is likely to be 
read by their superiors might have led to a certain degree of participation bias. Having said 
that, this threat to the study’s reliability was greatly reduced by only interviewing the 
employees on a voluntary basis and by ensuring them of their anonymity. All of the 
respondents also seemed very engaged in the research topic and expressed that they were eager 
to see the study’s final results. Hence, we feel that they saw the benefit of answering as 
honestly as possible so that the study produced reliable results that could benefit the 
organisation.  
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Although most of the interviews were conducted individually in a private setting, meaning that 
the influence of external factors was kept to a minimum, three of the function people were 
interviewed together with the country manager present as well. Interviewing the respondents 
in a group can potentially have induced some participation bias as the different individuals 
might have avoided expressing their true opinion for fear of being judged by the others who 
were present.  
Researcher error 
Researcher error refers to any factors that might have influenced the researchers’ ability to 
gather and interpret information (Saunders et al., 2016). To minimise this threat, both 
researchers were present at all the interviews. We also recorded and later transcribed the 
interviews which guaranteed that we were analysing the correct data at all time. This also 
allowed us to focus on non-verbal signals as well and therefore strengthened the interpretation 
of the data. Furthermore, an interview guide was applied which ensured a certain 
standardisation in regards to the information we were able to collect. All in all, we regard the 
threat of researcher error to be low.  
Research bias 
Finally, researcher bias relates to any factors that induces a bias in the researchers’ analysis 
and presentation of the data (Saunders et al., 2016). None of the researchers in this study have 
any personal affiliations with Statoil outside this research project. Although it is a well-known 
company in Norway, we were not familiar with its management control system practices 
before conducting the study. Furthermore, we have attempted to be conscious of the subjective 
nature that the interpretation of qualitative studies brings and thus tried to be as objective as 
possible throughout the process.  
Validity  
Validity refers to the degree to which the collected data represents the phenomenon that is 
being studied and consists of three different aspects: construct, internal and external validity 
(Johannessen, Kristoffersen, & Tufte, 2011). Construct validity is primarily associated with 
quantitative research and considers if a variable or construct measures what it is intended to 
measure (Saunders et al., 2016). We do not regard it to be necessary for us to reflect upon this 
as our study is of a qualitative nature. This means that we have had the opportunity to minimise 
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any construct validity issues through making sure that all our interview questions were 
correctly understood.  
Internal validity  
Internal validity refers to the extent of which the research can establish a causal relationship 
between two variables (Saunders et al., 2016). In this study, it discusses whether the opinions 
of our respondents reflect the sentiments of the groups that they represent, respectively 
Statoil’s corporate body and the employees that are affected by the changes made to the 
management control system. All of our respondents were selected on the basis of their 
knowledge of the two formalisations that have been introduced in the organisation. As our 
sample suggest, they are also spread over four different respondent groups meaning that we 
have been given access to a differentiated sample of the company. By basing our research on 
theory, interviews and internal documents, we also achieve triangulation which Saunders et 
al. (2016) argue will lend support as to whether the data is indeed telling us wat we think it is 
telling us. Having said that, although this study is based on non-probability sampling that does 
not aim to determine anything statistically, it is reasonable to point out that 14 interviews 
would be insufficient to get a fully representative picture.  
External validity  
External validity concerns whether the study’s findings can be generalised to other relevant 
settings or groups (Saunders et al., 2016). As our overall research question implies, this study 
aims to infer something about how two contradictory formalisations are interpreted in 
organisations on a general basis. Although our study is specific for the Statoil’s management 
control system practices, the different degrees of formalisations that we study are of a generic 
nature. The same can be said for the theoretical perspective that has been applied. Therefore, 
we believe that our study is of value to other organisations that wish to introduce different 
degrees of formalisations. Having said that, we recognise that it would have been beneficial 
to review several organisations over a longer period of time.  
3.5 Ethical issues  
Saunders et al. (2016) refer to research ethics as the standards of behaviour that guide the 
researcher’s conduct in regards to those who are either a direct subject of the study or affected 
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by it in any other way. Diener and Crandall (1978) have broken issues related to ethics into 
four main areas that researchers must consider when conducting a research procedure: 
Whether there is harm to participants, whether there is a lack of informed consent, whether 
there is an invasion of privacy, whether there is deception involved. 
Harm to Participants  
Harm to participants refers to the fact the researcher must be considerate of emotional well-
being, mental or physical health, or social or group cohesion (Saunders et al., 2016). Most 
relevant for this study is the degree to which we have managed to ensure the confidentiality 
and anonymity that we promised the research participants before conducting the interviews. 
Ensuring full anonymity is somewhat challenging in this study as we have interviewed senior 
figures in the company that are likely to be well-known in the company both by position and 
reputation. However, we have avoided mentioning specifically which country managers, 
members of corporate or members of the function that we interviewed, and instead referred to 
them as members of different employee groups. This increases the degree of anonymity 
substantially. Personal characteristics that could figure as identifiers have also been excluded 
to the extent it has been possible.  
Informed consent 
Informed consent involves the researchers providing the respondents with enough information 
so that they understand the implications of their participation before giving their consent 
(Saunders et al., 2016). The research participants were all fully informed about who we were 
and our objectives by both us and our contact person in Statoil who helped to set up the 
interviews. This allowed them to make an informed decision on whether to participate or not.  
Invasion of privacy  
This area is very much linked to informed consent because by giving informed consent, 
respondents express that they understand and accept the implications of their participation, 
also in regards to privacy-related issues (Diener & Crandall, 1978). Having said that, the 
researcher must still make sure to act responsibly in regard to the respondents’ privacy and 
personal values. In regards to this, we made sure to communicate that the respondents were 
free to refuse to answer questions. We abstained from pressing for an answer beyond what is 
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reasonable.  In general, we experienced little hesitation from the respondents during the 
interviews, and we, therefore, assume that they did not experience any invasion of their 
privacy.  
Deception 
Deception occurs when researchers intentionally present their research to the participants as 
something other than what it actually is (Diener & Crandall, 1978). This was not an issue in 
our study as it was in our self-interest to present the research topic as accurately as possible to 
ensure that we would obtain both relevant and accurate information. 
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4 Empirical background 
In this chapter, we will present Statoil as a study object. Further, we will describe the changes 
Statoil have made to their Management Control System (MCS) as well as a brief presentation 
of the story behind these changes. The following information was retrieved from the Statoil 
Book, internal documents, the Statoil web page as well as interviews with Statoil employees. 
4.1 Statoil as a study object 
Oil is a cyclical business (Financial Times, 2016). In 2014, Chevron CEO John Watson stated 
that "labour and capital costs have more than doubled in the last ten years, creating a "new 
reality" for energy producers and consumers". With prices dropping from a level of around 
$100 per barrel in 2014 to $27 per barrel in 2016 (52 Week Low as per 22/11/16) 
(InvestmentMine, 2016), it is the worst decline for three decades. According to industry 
experts, oil prices could remain at $50 per barrel for a long time. The drop in prices has made 
oil companies look at themselves, reconfiguring their organisations and look at relationships 
with suppliers and governments to cut costs, adjusting to an era of lower oil prices (Financial 
Times, 2015).  
Statoil ASA was formed following a decision by the Norwegian Parliament in 1972. Statoil is 
an international energy company employing 31,175 people across 41 different countries and 
territories (Statoil d, 2016). The primarily focus is on upstream oil and gas operations. In 2007, 
Statoil merged with Hydro’s oil and gas division in a deal thought to be worth $29bn, making 
it the largest offshore operator in the world (Financial Times, 2006). Statoil's' headquarter is 
situated in Norway, and the company is listed on the Oslo and New York stock exchanges. 
The Norwegian State is the largest shareholder, holding 67% of the shares (Statoil e, 2016).  
Low oil and gas prices have affected Statoil’s financial results over the last years. 3rd quarter 
results for 2016 were presented during the work on this dissertation, reporting a net operating 
income of USD 737 million compared to USD 883 million in the same period of 2015. 
Adjusted earnings after tax were a negative USD 261 million, compared to USD 445 million 
the previous year (Statoil, 2016). Just like its competitors, cutting costs has become an 
increasingly important factor to remaining profitable as low prices continue to weigh on the 
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industry. Specifically, the outlook in the 3rd quarter results states an expectation to “deliver 
efficiency improvements with pre-tax cash flow effects of around USD 2.5 billion from 2016”.  
The magnitude of Statoil’s operations implies a substantial need for an efficient management 
control system (MCS). The system in place today has been evolved since 1972. With new 
processes introduced over time, there has been increasing bureaucracy and rigidity (Bogsnes, 
2013). Further, merging with what was one of the world's largest aluminium companies 
implied the need for substantial change to Statoil as an organisation. An integration planning 
team (IPT) was appointed in order to develop an efficient model for cooperation (Szumilas & 
Stensaker, 2009). At the time of the merger it was announced that the new entity would be 
carried out from Statoil's guidelines, structures and control systems, but at the same time draw 
on best practices from both companies. IPT argued that a whole new organisation had to be 
created, where one of the main focus areas would be to standardise work processes. The aim 
was that it should result in increased economies of scale, standardisation gains, as well as 
identify and diffusing best practice which results in reduced costs and greater efficiency.   
Although the changes to Statoil’s MCS were deemed necessary in a time of substantial 
organisational change, there has been a recognition the last couple of years that the focus on 
standardisation has gone somewhat too far. In an attempt to steer everything in the same 
direction the MCS ended up becoming excessively detail oriented. As a result, Statoil at one 
time had as many as 160 000 different formalisations.  
The need for change was confirmed by the Gullfaks C incident in 2010 where Statoil 
experienced a serious gas leakage on one of its platforms. Norway’s Petroleum Safety 
Authority highlighted several weaknesses in the MCS connected to risk management and 
insufficient use of governing documents as part of the cause (Petroleumstilsynet, 2011).  
Such incidents showed Statoil that they might be taking the safety and control measures too 
far. The significant focus on control and standardisation did not take into account the different 
operating conditions in Statoil. Further, the drop in oil prices has forced Statoil to cut costs 
across the organisation. This was the starting point for the Management System Roadmap (MS 
Roadmap) process when it was initiated in 2013. The goal of the MS Roadmap is to increase 
efficiency in operations by giving a larger autonomy to the line as well as reducing the number 
of governing documents.   
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Almost at the same time as MS Roadmap, Statoil has introduced a framework for risk 
management; RM100. RM100 is based on ISO 31000 – Risk Management. ISO 31000 was 
introduced by the International Organization for Standardization and “…provides principles, 
framework and a process for managing risk. It can be used by any organisation regardless of 
its size, activity or sector. Using ISO 31000 can help organisations increase the likelihood of 
achieving objectives, improve the identification of opportunities and threats and effectively 
allocate and use resources for risk treatment.”(International Organization for Standardization, 
2009) Minimising or mitigating risk is crucial to Statoil. Risk is being discussed and 
communicated through the organisation, arriving at the corporate level for discussion if 
necessary. While risk has always been discussed, there has not been one single standardisation 
for how to communicate risk. At the corporate level, this has made it difficult to compare risk 
from different projects and countries, thus leading to the need for a standardised way of risk 
communication. 
We will present RM100 and MS Roadmap in more detail in the next part. However, 
interestingly, these are two different types of formalisations. While MS Roadmap is a rather 
large change involving both new roles in the organisation and adjustments to the autonomy of 
the line, RM100 is a standardisation of something Statoil is doing already (i.e., risk 
communication). Further, RM100 is a way of coercing employees and saying "this is how you 
are supposed to do it", while the MS Roadmap is trying to enable employees to be more 









4.2 The Management Control System in Statoil and MS 
Roadmap 
“We have a management system which defines how we work and describes how we lead and 









Statoil's Management System (MS) is defined by six different components, as illustrated in 
the figure 6. The Statoil Book represents the foundations and describes Statoil's values, what 
is expected of employees and leaders as well as describing the operating model and corporate 
policies. The goal of the book is to ensure that Statoil operates safely and to assure effectivity 
in the operations. 
Fundamentals, requirements and recommendations are reflected in the Statoil Book. Further, 
as a part of the operating model, the book lays out the organisational principles. These 
principles describe the structure of the organisation and how it is managed. We shall not go 
into depth describing this model, but the first principle is of high significance in this case, as 














Asset-based entities, such as platform managers, are supported by function-based entities, such 
as Security, Safety & Sustainability (SSU). If the country is part of DPI, it is supported by DPI 
SSU. Each business area, such as DPI, has both asset-based entities and function-based entities 
supporting the assets. Within this matrix, there exists procedures and requirements describing 
what is expected from each entity. 
Process Owner – Removed as a part of MS Roadmap 
 
Figure 8: Process owners removed (Statoil b, 2013) 
 Figure 7: Statoil's Management Control System (Statoil b, 2016) 
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This role was removed as a part of MS Roadmap. However, we find it necessary to describe 
the role as several of our respondents refer to it when responding.   
The process owners were appointed for the significant process areas. The main responsibilities 
of the process owner were to develop and improve Statoil global work progress and to drive 
simplification and improvement initiatives across the group. These improvements and 
initiatives were based on best practice and lessons learned throughout the organisation. 
Further, they had a supporting role when it came to monitoring compliance towards Statoil's 
global requirements as well as supporting business areas in the deployment of defined 
positions. 
COO – Introduced as a part of MS Roadmap 
The Chief Operating Officer is accountable for ensuring that the management system 
framework and tools needed in the organisation to enable safe, efficient and reliable operations 
are in place. The COO and his staff are responsible for maintaining safety and efficiency in all 
operations. Instead of having one Process Owner responsible for standardisation within each 
discipline, the new COO-position is responsible for standardisation across all disciplines. 
Though the similarity to a Process Owner is there, the COO drive general and broader 
improvement programs across all disciplines in contrast to the more asset-specific or function 
specific standardisations that was made by the Process Owners.  
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The Execution Framework 
 
Figure 9: The Execution Framework (Statoil b, 2013) 
An important part when describing the operating model of Statoil is the Ambition To Action. 
Ambition to action is Statoil’s integrated performance process. It serves three purposes, the 
second purpose being most relevant to this case: “Create a dynamic and flexible execution 
framework” (Statoil b, 2013, p.29).  
The Execution Framework is dynamic, but with clear boundaries. As an employee, you are 
expected to use and operate within this latitude. You are expected to make your own decisions, 
but not at the expense of other parts of the organisation.  
The line role has authority and acts by the management system, in this sense, a platform 
manager can stop his/her operations when experiencing a large risk exposure. 
An evolving management system – acknowledging the need for efficiency 
After the merger between Statoil and Hydro in 2007, there was a need for a common culture 
and a common way of operating. As a result, post-merger Statoil has had different programmes 
facilitating best practices, harmonising processes and with experts looking at the management 
system (see figure 10).   
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Figure 10: The evolvment of Statoil's management system (Golf, 2016) 
All of the programmes from 2008-2012 have had a significant focus on safety and 
standardisation. But, with the HSE Culture & learning programme that started in 2012, there 
was a shift in the focus. While safety was still highly important, one also began to look at 
efficiency. An internal survey from 2013 showed that while 75% of the respondents agree that 
the MS enables high safety level, the same number for efficiency was only 37%. Thus, Statoil 
acknowledged that they had been taking the safety and control measures too far. Efficiency 
also affects cost, thus, this was a big business case if Statoil managed to increase efficiency in 
operations without affecting safety. This was the starting point for the MS Roadmap 
programme.  
4.3 Risk Management in Statoil  
Risk Management in Statoil was first formalised in 1997 when CEO Hans Nordvik asked for 
an enterprise view of Statoil’s risk profile. A risk committee was established shortly after and 
since then different models, dealing with a variety of risks, have been developed, including 
country, financial, market, commercial and safety risk. 
Statoil defines risk as “a deviation from a specified reference value and the associated 
uncertainties” (Aven, 2016). The organisation measures it through impact in accordance to a 
predefined scale, by using knowledge-based probabilities and by applying known 
uncertainty factors. Statoil's risk definition underlines the importance of identifying a 
reference value. This is developed carefully for each project in advance by discipline experts 
who rely on technical analysis and in-house business cases. Statoil also makes a point of 
distinguishing between risk and risk factors. Where the former focuses on the fact that 
something can go wrong, the latter seeks to understand why it goes wrong. 
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Statoil differentiates between three different types of risk management:  
 
1) Enterprise risk management (ERM) manages company-wide risk and concerns any 
risk that can lead to direct value impact on Statoil’s bottom line. It focuses on 
economic impact and incidents.  
 
2) Task risk management (TRM) deals with the risk that is typically connected to the 
delivery aspects that support Statoil's value creation such as time, cost and quality 
issues. A TRM can become an ERM if the delivery aspects are believed to result in 
direct value impact on Statoil’s bottom line.  
 
3) Personal risk management (PRM) consists of risk that is solely connected to the 
individual manager or employee. Hence, it does not directly concern the enterprise at 
large.  
 
As well as providing Statoil with a useful categorisation of its risk management, the 
distinction is also used to decide who is accountable for the different risks that exist. The 
term risk owner is important within the organisation and indicates who is accountable for the 
impact that a risk potentially can generate. In regards to the different risk categories, ERM is 
dealt with by asset owners within their specific asset areas. TRM usually concerns project-
specific risk and is therefore handled by the project manager. In cases where risk connected 
to a certain project is thought to lead to value impact, meaning that the risk is relabelled as 
ERM, the project manager remains the risk owner on behalf of the asset owner. Finally, 
PRM is dealt with on an individual level.  
Risk Management in the MCS 
Risk is embedded as a central feature of Statoil’s MCS. First of all, it is part of Statoil’s 




Figure 11: Statoil's Management Control System (Aven, 2016) 
 
 
In figure 11, the organisation's values are placed at the top of the pyramid, which represents 
The Statoil book's main topics in prioritised order. One of Statoil's central values is to be 
courageous, and the ability to both understand and managing risk is listed as a significant 
contribution to achieving just that. 
 
Furthermore, Statoil's MCS consist of many Functional Requirements which present what 
needs to be done to adhere to the foundation laid by the Statoil book (Aven, 2016). 
Functional requirement 08 (FR08) deals with risk and lists 13 requirements for what 
employees should act upon to deal with risk appropriately (Statoil c, 2016). 
 
Next in Statoil's MCS when it comes to dealing with risk is RM100, this is a procedure for 
how risk management should be conducted. RM100 is based on the ISO31000 standards but 
is customised to Statoil's needs. 
The RM100 procedure 
RM100 was introduced in Statoil 01.01.2016 by Statoil’s corporate risk team. It is available 
for employees through the organisation’s intranet, and consists of seven different actions for 




Figure 12: RM100 (Aven, 2016) 
Define the context establishes what the risk is and who it potentially affects. This is usually 
done by following the requirements in FR08. 
 
The three steps describe risk, analyse risk and evaluate action are part of the risk assessment 
process in RM100. In Describe risk, the aim is simply to identify what potentially can go 
wrong in the predefined situation. In regards to Statoil's definition of risk, this relates to 
detecting where the deviations from the specified reference value might occur. The user is 
instructed only to consider what is believed to be the most realistic deviations that could 
have value impact on Statoil's bottom line. 
 
When the potential risk has been identified the user moves on to the action; analyse risk. 
Different probabilities, scenarios and potential value impact figures are applied in order to 
evaluate the situation at hand.  
 
The final step in the risk assessment process is to evaluate action. Here, the user must 
consider the cost/benefit of the different measures needed to alter a potential risk. Statoil 
operates with a principle called “As Low As Reasonably Possible” (ALARP) which signals 
that taking risk has both a potential upside and downside to it. Hence, the company is 
prepared to expose itself to risk if adjusting the situation conflicts with what is considered to 
be reasonable.  
 
The last three steps of the process cover the operative part of RM100. These are called 
"decide action", "ensure implementation of action" and "follow-up risk". The first two are 
about choosing and setting in motion the necessary actions considering the conclusions from 
RM100's previous steps. Lastly, RM100 requires an evaluation of the effects the actions 
have had on dealing with the risk in question. In cases where the visible results are not 
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deemed satisfactory, the user must conduct a review and re-do the steps that are believed to 
have affected the process negatively. Hence, the user does not necessarily need to carry out 
all seven steps all over again. 
 
To make risk assessments comparable across projects, the standard RM100 procedure 
reviews projects over a 12-month period. In cases where projects have shorter time-
perspectives, the user has the option of applying a modified and less detailed orientated 
version.  
 
RM100 is primarily intended for asset owners performing ERM or for project managers who 
are about to conduct larger projects. However, the decision of whether to use RM100 or not 
is left to the individual employee that is in charge of the specific operation. The rule though 
is that RM100 should be applied in cases where a potential value impact on Statoil’s bottom 
line can occur.  
 
Although the predefined risk owner is accountable for carrying out RM100 when thought 
necessary, he or she is supported by discipline experts who provide advice throughout the 
process. In principle, the risk owner has the final say and therefore also has the power to 
defy the recommendations that have been given. However, this rarely happens as it is in the 
risk owner's best interest to follow the given advice. Top management would also require a 
good reason for doing so. Instead, Statoil's practice of holding the risk owner accountable for 
the process acts as part of the organisation's single point of accountability-principle. The 
point here is to avoid ambiguous situations where no one is held accountable. Hence, the 
principle is also a driving force in making sure that the correct risk assessments and 
precautions are taken. 
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5 Empirical findings 
In this chapter, we present our empirical findings. They have been retrieved from interviews 
with Statoil employees which were conducted as part of this thesis’ case-study. As explained 
in section 3.3 – Sampling Technique, our top-down approach has meant that we have used a 
dualistic approach when gathering data. In order to answer our overall research question, we 
chose to interview both members belonging to Statoil’s corporate division (sections 5.1 & 5.2) 
as well as representatives from the employees who have been influenced by the two changes 
made to the management control system (sections 5.3 & 5.4). 
5.1 Corporate View: MS Roadmap 
The respondents in this part of our empirical findings represent Group 2: Two members of the 
corporate operational staff (See section 3.3 – The sample).  
Increasing operational efficiency without comprising on safety  
Our respondents from the corporate body of Statoil seem to agree on the intentions behind MS 
Roadmap. The main intention has been to increase efficiency in operations without affecting 
safety, and making the MCS more dynamic and less comprehensive, without affecting quality. 
Obviously, when speaking of efficiency one is also talking about cutting costs. With oil prices 
dropping in a high-cost industry like the oil & gas industry, reducing costs is important. Thus, 
MS Roadmap has been a large business case in terms of costs.  
"We're talking a quite extreme business case. Small changes in unnecessary quality controls 
or involvement – we're talking about hundreds of millions when you scale this to the whole 
organisation" 
Further, there is an important point to take into account when speaking of MS Roadmap. Our 
respondents talk about the intention of a cultural change. Interestingly, the room for latitude 
has always been there, according to our respondents – but the considerable focus on safety and 
standardisation has, over time, led to a culture where this latitude has been neglected. 
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"I think this change (MS ROADMAP) is a pure cultural project. It's not about 106 000 
requirements or 40 000 requirements".  
Move accountability closer to where value is created  
Our interviews show that the removal of the process owner role reflected several intentions. 
First, it was a way of moving the accountability closer to where the value is created. By 
removing the process owner role, the line is now supposed to identify the processes that fit 
their operation. This was much harder before, as the process owners had a significant power 
in terms of being specialists.   
"It is the people "out there" who take the consequence if a platform blows up, so these people 
must also be accountable for the choices that they make. There is no need for all the people 
involved in the decision-making process, there is too much unnecessary exchange of opinions"  
"Statoil has a complex matrix organisation. You can even argue that it is not a matrix, as you 
have a third dimension with the process owners. It's within these power-struggles between the 
strong lines of discipline specialists and the line and central management that we have 
removed one instance. This can be positive and it can be negative, but the discipline related 
competence is still there, we have just reduced the power you have as a specialist."  
Second, by moving the accountability closer to the line, the intention has been to re-establish 
The Execution Framework. According to our interviews, there has been a significant tendency 
in Statoil, and oil & gas in general, where the focus on manuals and standardisation of 
processes has reduced the use of sound judgement. Thus, the execution framework described 
in the Statoil Book has been shrinking. One of the main intentions behind the MS Roadmap 
has been to re-establish the use of sound judgement and to change the culture when thinking 
of this execution framework.  
"It's about being very clear about where the responsibility lies. There has been a duality in 
this, as everyone has a responsibility to challenge if things don't make sense. This culture has 
been a dilemma all the way as we've had a lot of people whose task has been to observe and 
tell you how processes should be done".  
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"The process owner decided. They were not above the country manager in the matrix but they 
were above in terms of expertise, so the country manager just had to accept and receive. Of 
course, this made the process owner a very dominant corporate role where they sat and 
decided for everyone. So when you do this change, now it's the BAs who has the corporate 
responsibility for the suggestion. No one is forced to comply".  
Our findings show that the COO-organisation was created to maintain the responsibility of 
driving improvement programmes, earlier held by process owners.  
"Now we have a COO who can drive large across-the-firm programmes when there is a need". 
Where Statoil earlier had one process owner per BA, the COO is now intended to think about 
standardisations that are sufficient for Statoil as a whole. This, again, aims to reduce the 
tension between specialists and the line, giving the line a larger autonomy.  
"What's dangerous is when you get very powerful disciplines. Then the discipline become more 
important than the values created, leading to a conflict between the specialists and those who 
is trying to create the value in the line". 
Further, our findings indicate that the COO is intended to maintain a degree of standardisation 
under these new circumstances where the line is given a larger autonomy.  
"The COO drives improvement where it's wanted, but now with an accept from the BAs”. 
Reducing the number of Governing Documents 
Each BA has been tasked to identify those governing documents relevant to them. The primary 
intention has been to increase efficiency in operations. Over time, governing documents has 
been added to make sure that Statoil operates in a similar manner in each country. This has led 
to a vast number of requirements but also recurrent deviations from these requirements, as 
they are not made to fit each country. By allowing each BA to identify those requirements and 
documents that are relevant to them, the intention has been to make it more understandable 
and efficient when operating.  
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"Its (i.e. the Management System) contributions in terms of effectivity was too low – which, in 
fact, was one of the original intentions behind the management system (increasing efficiency)".  
"We had a management system that was seen as both rigid and slow. The MS had a lot of 
requirements and an inconsistent architecture. Deviations happened all the time, showing us 
that, in a lot of cases, the system didn't match the actual operation." 
In addition to removing documents, a lot of the content has also been reviewed and made more 
concise. There seems to have been a lack of communication between those who made the 
documents and those using them.  
"I think those who made the barriers did so with the best of intentions. It was often an 
underlying expectation that the barriers had to be interpreted and that they came with latitude, 
but more often than not, this was not exploited. Rather, the requirements were often read as 
absolute".  
Our respondents agree that reducing the disconnect between those making the documents and 
those using them will lead to a more efficient use regarding understanding the documents, thus 
leading to fewer deviations. This, in addition to the reduction of governing documents, will 
make it less comprehensive to the user and incentivise users to work with, and understand, the 
documents – not only using them because one has to.  
"We had 106 000 governing documents, but we had used too little time on making the users 
understand what's relevant to them and what the intention was. The result was that people in 
the line had too little capacity to work with this".  
Lastly, our findings show that the rate of change is very high and the communication of change 
has been bad. Many changes that are made centrally never reach the persons implicated, 
according to our corporate respondents. The intention has been to allow those implicated to 
make the changes themselves, resulting in better implementation and understanding of 
changes.  
"When leaders are engaged, we see that there is a good understanding of our MS, but when 
leaders don't engage we see that this is reflected in the units".  
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Design & Implementation 
The MS Roadmap process started in late 2013. The first part was to establish the facts and 
build the business case. This was based on a wide range of information. 
"We did an evaluation internally in all the BAs and asked how they experienced the 
management system. We looked at events, did user surveys and looked at what other 
companies were doing. This was all to create a more precise picture of the situation". 
The business case was then presented to the board in order to get their acceptance. It was 
decided to try these changes as pilots on Statfjord and Mongstad.  
"What we did at Statfjord and Mongstad was to go in and work with these assets to come up 
with a plan. We called this the "clean sheet approach". The thought was to tell the platforms: 
"If you were to build your own management system from scratch, how would this look? And 
further, if you were to design an efficient organisation, how would this look?".  
According to our respondents, the concept of removing the process owner role was not an easy 
one to get accepted by the board. The process role had a very strong position in the 
organisation.  
"They were sceptical to this as they were afraid to let too much loose. They told us that they 
believed in what we communicated and that this was the way to go, but wanted to test this 
through pilots".  
After the pilots, the first step of MS Roadmap was to remove the process owner role, this was 
done in order to make it clear to the line that they had the accountability from now on. 
"The first change that we did was to remove the process owner role. The process owner who 
is sitting in a centralised staff must be moved out and into the business areas responsible for 
the operations. We're not going to have a process owner who is sitting on the outside who has 
an opinion but who isn't listening to what the line needed. So what we did was to move this 
role over to the BAs in order to ensure that the responsibility was clear". 
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The accountability for the process of identifying relevant governing documents has been given 
to the country managers. This was decided by DPI. According to our respondents, this was a 
tough decision to make, but in the end, it is the country manager who is sitting with the legal 
liability, thus making it the most natural choice. Although the accountability lies with the 
country manager, the process involves support from the functions.  
"Now, all country managers have accountability when deciding what governing documents 
and which processes that are relevant to them. That's the principle. But no one knows 
everything, so they have to use the functions. This is where such as SSU, people & leadership, 
finance & control comes into the picture, and they have a close dialogue with the country 
manager. They make some suggestions and the country manager decides whether to accept or 
not"  
According to our respondents, workshops have been held together with the country managers 
for the different type of countries where Statoil operates.  
"We've had workshops with the different type of countries. The countries where we only have 
a presence, where we have made investments and the countries where we are operational, 
together with country managers and together with functions. It's now very clear to them what 
kind of accountability they have".  
The corporate view is that everyone is happy about this change in the management system.  
"It's a relief, you know. To get rid of everything not relevant. It makes it easier for them to see 






5.2 Corporate View: RM100 
The respondents in is this part of our empirical findings represent Group 1: Three members 
from the corporate risk team (See section 3.3 – The sample).  
The intended RM100 users 
The respondents from Statoil’s corporate risk team expressed that they expected RM100 to 
primarily be directly used by project managers or other risk owners connected to production 
and operations, but with the support from discipline experts from the functions. 
"Previously, corporate risk wanted procedures such as RM100 to be conducted by people 
doing enterprise risk management. These are people in an asset based entity…Now we have 
instructed the people who are in charge of the big projects to conduct the whole process as 
well. So it is not just for ERM any longer." 
Having said that, they also explained how they expect country managers to be well aware of 
how RM100 works and also of the risk assessment procedures within their country. The 
following is a reflection of their role as leaders as well as the fact that they will be held legally 
responsible if anything goes wrong with Statoil’s operations in their country. Furthermore, the 
respondents elaborated on how country managers often are expected to contribute directly to 
the RM100 procedure in certain areas as well. They must also use RM100 when developing 
bi-annual country risk map-evaluations for the corporate leadership.  
Creating a more efficient procedure for risk management in Statoil  
The respondents expressed that one of the main motivations behind the introduction of RM100 
was to make risk management in Statoil a simpler and more concise procedure to conduct. 
“Everyone in Statoil has worked with risk management at some point, and there have been a 
number of risk management processes in the MCS. Previously, we’ve had SF421 at the top 
level, which is quite similar to RM100. However, further down there have been as many as 
113 different requirements, making risk management a far too heavy and complicated 
procedure to deal with”.  
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In regards to this, the respondents explained how the organisation has aimed to gather the 
many different processes for risk management that existed into one procedure for everyone to 
follow. This makes it easier for employees to know where to turn to when there is a need for 
a risk management assessment.  
Furthermore, the respondents explain how they have focused on cutting down on the number 
of requirements. RM100 now contains nine requirements spread over the seven steps that the 
procedure consists of. Three of them are generic, and six are connected specifically to Safety, 
Sustainability and Development (SSD).  
The interviewees also explained that the far too detailed risk management procedure the 
organisation had before was partially a consequence of the low barriers that previously existed 
for introducing new requirements to the system. To ensure that RM100 remains simple and 
concise also in the future, the risk management procedure now requires a substantial amount 
of work before a new requirement can be implemented. Amongst other things, when someone 
from management wants to introduce a new requirement, they must communicate and 
implement it sufficiently for it to count.   
“You can’t just make a new process and implement it any longer…Now, one develops the 
governing document; one has to ask the potential users for feedback, you plan the 
implementation and the communication, you must support the implementation, and you have 
to complete the necessary implementation activities. So there’s now quite a lot of work that 
needs to be done before you can press the implement-button”.  
Overall, the respondents highlighted that the underlying goal behind the RM100-project had 
been to make risk management in Statoil more efficient and engaging for the user.  
“Making it more efficient for the user has been an important goal for us, and we believe the 
initial response indicates that we have been successful in doing so. The process is now at a 
level that people can actually relate to. There are now nine requirements in total…and this 
something people are able to learn. 100 requirements, even though people were working 
within a specific area, was too much to deal with”.  
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Create a more standardised procedure for risk management reporting 
The interviewees expressed that another important motivation for introducing RM100 was to 
create a more standardised procedure for risk assessments in the organisation. The respondents 
pointed out that this had been made possible because there now is only one procedure for risk 
assessments as opposed to the many that existed before. Furthermore, RM100 also contains 
standardised formats and scales for everyone to use when assessing risk. 
One of the intentions behind the standardisation was to make life easier for those who read the 
risk assessment reports on a regular basis. According to the interviewees, it is now easier for 
those at the corporate leadership level, who look into many different risk assessments on a 
regular basis, to understand what is being reported. Previously they spent a substantial amount 
of time trying to interpret what the different reports that they had to read were trying to express. 
A standardised format avoids this problem. The respondents also stated that the standardisation 
has, for the same reason, made it easier communicate risk across the whole company.  
“Previously, we had all sorts of formats for risk analysis…This took time and created 
complications. Therefore, when it is to be reported at a certain level, the format must be known 
by corporate leadership so that they don’t have to spend time trying to understand the 
diagrams. This also makes it easier to compare with others, and creates a more efficient 
process”.  
The respondents also highlight that it is difficult to get dispensation from any of RM100’s 
requirements, meaning that the users must follow procedures rigorously. This contributes to 
the standardisation of the reports.  
“I own six of the requirements, and I will only give temporarily dispensation if there is a very 
good reason for doing so…We will not give any permanent dispensations unless legal 
requirements make it stricter for them”.  
One of the respondents admitted that trying to create a standardised procedure across an 
organisation operating in such a variety of countries and environments was a challenging 
process. However, she pointed out that whether the user is operating in Norway’s offshore 
environment, dealing with oil sand in Canada or working in the cold climate of Russia, RM100 
should be an adequate tool.  
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“In RM100, you have to define the context for every risk management process that you 
conduct…The first think you have to do in the risk management procedure is to understand 
the context and understand what you are going to manage...The users will be entering a variety 
of environments with different needs in regards to what you need to be attentive to…Our 
framework only gives instructions on which risks you should be thinking about regardless of 
where you are operating”. 
The design and Implementation process  
The respondents explained how a group of nine people from the corporate risk team were 
responsible for both designing and implementing RM100. The aim was to create an optimal 
risk management procedure for the user, and when it was close to being finished, certain parts 
of the organisation were invited to give their feedback. 
“A group of people, mainly from Statoil’s corporate body from the SSU area were invited to 
contribute. So we had people from Safety, Security and Sustainability who were involved in 
the discussions. We also discussed things with previous process owners, because you have to 
discuss things with the discipline experts who designed the previous requirements before you 
remove them.” 
However, the team chose to stop at the corporate and former process owner level when asking 
for advice on the design; hence the employees whom RM100 was intended for were not 
included in the process. 
“People in the functions and from the central team further down were not involved”.  
When the design process was finished, the team conducted a number of steps in order to make 
sure that RM100 was sufficiently implemented into the organisation.  
“We conducted a stakeholder analysis based on the feedback sessions we had during the 
design process to decide how we should proceed in the implementation phase”. 
The respondents explained how the implementation was done through presentations to 
different leadership groups based on the stakeholder analysis that was conducted earlier.  
“A lot of the presentations were done via video. But we also travelled around and presented 
it to several leadership groups. HMS has one leadership group; finance has one etc.…some 
 64
presentations have been chosen from our side, and some have been requested by the groups 
themselves.  
They also focused on presenting it to the safety, security and sustainability group (SSU), who 
amongst other things act as a support function in all the operational parts of Statoil. However, 
the respondents also mentioned that they did not present RM100 directly to the country 
managers, nor to discipline experts outside of SSU who are not part of a leadership group. 
This means that they did not present directly to many of the intended RM100 users.   
Instead, employees who received the presentation were obliged to pass on the knowledge to 
those they thought would need it. To help them in this process, the corporate risk team created 
an e-learning platform which could be passed on. The respondents state that this ensured that 
the knowledge was communicated sufficiently. Taking the e-learning course was on the whole 
not mandatory. However, the team communicated that they expected anyone working with 
risk to do so. By looking at numbers on who has taken the e-learning course, though, they 
could get a picture of how actively RM100 was being implemented across different parts of 
the organisation. On top of the e-learning platform, they have also offered to hold presentations 
on the subject for any part of the organisation that requests it. 
The respondents vary slightly in their interpretation of how successful the implementation 
process has been. Two of them call it an unconditional success, stating that:  
“Everything has gone as planned. What has gone better than planned is the number of people 
who have wanted us to come and hold courses on risk management and RM100. It has really 
been a very good process”.  
The last respondent from the corporate team agrees that it has gone very well, but also adds 
that it has varied to what extent RM100 has been passed on to others in the organisation beyond 
those who received the presentations. 
“How strongly this has been prioritised has really depended on who sits at the top. Some 
business areas have had a very strong advocate for the the implementation of it. In these cases, 
we notice that it is known across many different departments with the business area”.  
They also explained that they try to communicate an open attitude towards feedback from the 
users:  
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“In the RM100 platform, one can enter improvement proposals. Someone from our team is 
required to answer the request within a certain amount of time”.  
Furthermore, the respondents underlined that they are still focusing on ensuring that the 
procedure is sufficiently implemented. Amongst other things, the e-learning platform is 
always available, and it is also still possible for any part of the organisation to request a 
presentation on the subject.  
“Implementing something in a large organisation is a continuous process. One is never quite 
finished, although most of the work is done at the beginning of course”. 
5.3 User Interpretation: MS Roadmap 
The respondents in is this part of our empirical findings represent Group 3: Four people from 
the function and Group 4: Five country managers (See section 3.3 – The sample).  
Moving accountability closer to where the value is created 
The respondents seem to agree that they now have more accountability compared to what was 
the case earlier, although the perceived level of change in accountability seems to vary 
between the respondents.  
"Earlier, the accountability related to technical requirements and standards was with the 
process owners and chief engineers. Now it's a new responsibility for us, the country 
managers. Obviously, that's a huge responsibility, especially when you're not an engineer, like 
me"  
"It's true (The accountability is larger now). But I think that we still felt pretty accountable for 
most of what happened in (…) already just because it was a bit different from what we were 
doing elsewhere within the Statoil organisation” 
The rise in the interpretation of accountability seems to come from two factors. They are now 
accountable in a larger way when it comes to technical requirements and standards, with the 
removal of the process owners, but further, they are now accountable for more across the BA.  
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"(…)The Country Manager is responsible for everyone across the BA. Governmental contact, 
public relations, compliance and even visitors to the country, it doesn't matter who's coming, 
the country manager must say ok. I think this role is something that we have become more 
conscious about than before. Earlier, exploration sent people in and then the country manager 
heard about it afterwards".  
A difference for the country managers is the ability to influence the bottom line in a larger 
way. Even though they were evaluated by and accountable for the bottom line in the country 
before MS Roadmap, the removal of the process owners has made a difference concerning 
what costs that are possible for them to influence.  
"As a Country Manager, you have to think about affordability. "What can we afford to build?". 
It doesn't help when the engineer says that "this is the best solution" when you look at the 
result and conclude that we cannot afford it." 
Execution Framework 
Building on the above, the fact that it is now easier to influence the bottom line seems to imply 
that there is a larger execution framework. But, when asked about latitude, the response is 
somewhat mixed. Some of the respondents agree that there is a larger latitude now:  
 "I think so. I think that it is much more difficult for anyone now to say to us that you need to 
do this less efficiently for some reason". 
Others are more reluctant, pointing to some areas with a larger latitude while others remain 
the same.  
"It's always interesting seeing who has primacy, especially when there is a conflict. What's 
demanding is that we are being measured on very different things. I'm being measured on the 
fact that we need to be cash-flow positive on 40 dollars, and then a function arrives with a lot 
of good stuff that I'd like to have, but I see that this doesn't fit with the cash-flow positive 
requirement. Right now we are cash-flow positive with 50 dollars, which means that we have 
to reduce stuff. And then the function arrives telling me that they have been told this and that 
from their line. Then there's a discussion". 
"Earlier, the PO could say "Sorry, I'm the PO, I decide". Now, this role is gone, but we still 
have chief engineers, and of course, these still have a lot of power in the organisation. There 
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is a two-way dialogue, so those who are technical people understand that there is financial 
economic reality in what we are doing. I think this has worked well. In other areas, where 
we're not necessarily talking about laws or technical requirements, here I feel that I have a 
rather large latitude in decision making".  
In terms of latitude, our respondents seem to agree that even though they in principal have 
more latitude, they still have the function and the chief engineers in the picture. This does limit 
the actual latitude. What is new though, is that some point to the fact that they are now 
participating in those discussions, not just being told what to do from the PO's.  
Interpretation of the support roles in the organisation 
As our findings show, the perceived change in latitude is affected by the supporting roles. 
When asked about the new COO-function, some of our respondents point at the COO-
organisation as very Norwegian, creating a disconnect.  
"The problem with that organisation is that I have this odd feeling that it is very Norwegian. 
A lot of parts of Statoil are very Norwegian, Statoil is still a very Norwegian place. Everything 
in Norway is very simple, not very much risk. Your perception of high risk can be general, but 
when it comes to the project it is different. So you have to take this into consideration." 
"(…)Then you have a COO-function. They are supposed to be the "effectivity-machine" in a 
company. Extremely difficult, if you ask me. It's very dependent on the people working there. 
Those people that Anders Opedal has brought with him, they know how to do this. Then he 
has a group that can get some stuff done, but it is an extremely difficult process to have this 
on the outside of the business, in a way. There will always be an element of something missing 
by not being on the pulse".  
However, as is reflected in the comments about the ability to take part in the discussions, the 
country managers now feel that they have the possibility to speak up if the COO-organisation 
sends out something that doesn't make sense to them.  
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Reduction in the number of governing documents 
Our findings show that although all of our respondents have reduced the amount of governing 
documents, their interpretation of how it has affected their work varies. Some think that fewer 
governing documents has increased effectivity:  
"We had that flexibility, but it was more difficult to be able to get the needed flexibility to be 
efficient enough. We were stuck with a system where we had to fight in order to work in the 
way we want to. Now we have a lot more flexibility". 
"(…)if we have had this process implemented now we would reach the same result much, much 
faster and spent much fewer man hours than we did 3-4 years ago". 
Other respondents are more reluctant when it comes to whether the reduction in documents 
has led to change in how they operate.  
"Of course it has simplified things in a way. We have reduced a number of requirements. But 
I'm not sure it all really means a lot. Because a lot of these requirements were never used 
before, they were just there. It was just a lot of mess, a lot of requirements that were never 
used, that were like, what is this? It was all nothing more than a process of cleaning up. So 
that was probably really the idea. So that we got back to something sensible. But the problem 
with as it was, was that people didn't really bother about it because too many things were not 
relevant. So now it's more relevant. But I don't think that for practical purposes that it has 
made much difference".  
Some of the respondents agree on the notion that the documents that were removed never were 
used in the first place. However, most of our respondents answer that the reduction has led to 
a better understanding of those documents that they are left with.  
"When thinking of the system as a whole, I think most people agree on the fact that the system 
had grown too large. How are you supposed to know the content of 3500 documents? I could 
stand there and say "I know them all" and "we comply with all of these documents", which 
created a false security, right?".  
 
 69 
"I think we ended up with 150 requirements instead of 3000 or what the number was when we 
started. So that was a huge help".  
Lack of communication between those making the documents and those 
using them 
All of the respondents agree that it is now easier to adapt documents to local requirements. As 
our respondents are from DPI, we find that this has been one of the largest differences 
concerning the changes in governing documents. They all point to the fact that the documents 
always have been very Norwegian and thus difficult to adapt in another country. This is one 
of the most important factors for Country Managers, as they are responsible for compliance 
with local law. The process of adapting documents to local conditions is easier now after the 
recent changes.  
"We now have no one telling us that we have to follow something. So TPD and Exploration 
have come up with a list of documents that they would like us to follow. However, we have to 
have our local representatives review those documents first before we can accept it. So we 
now have the opportunity to review documents and decide if they are relevant in (country) as 
opposed to before". 
"It is very rare that the changes we propose are not accepted as long as we've done a risk-
based approach and show that it is risk-based in relation to our context".  
"Statoil used to have an idea of this very standardised and centralised model, and there are a 
lot of good elements to that. But that's become more nuanced and risk-based. And I think that 
that is overall positive".  
Execution Framework 
Our findings show that there is a dichotomy in regards to the governing documents and change 
in execution framework. As some of our respondents point out, a large number of the 
documents removed were never used. Thus, the removal does not necessarily change how they 
work. However, the reduction in itself leads to a more specific and tailor-made management 
system that is more flexible than earlier. Whether or not this in itself has led to a larger 
execution framework is difficult to assess. If execution framework is understood as the ability 
to deviate from requirements, then our respondents agree that there has been some change. If 
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the execution framework is to be understood as a cultural change, our respondents seem to be 
more reluctant and varied in their response. Some answer very "correct" when speaking of 
this.  
"Regarding our latitude, there are requirements, and we follow them. To me, there's no 
problem. And then we have to acknowledge that the requirements in our governing documents 
are conditions that have been discussed and debated thoroughly, and thus is an answer to the 
risk evaluation of the operation that you are going to do. (…) And if it is irrelevant or stupid 
or silly, then it shouldn't have been there in the first place. And that is another discussion".  
Some of our respondents find the requirements linked to some areas more important than other 
areas.  
"Of course some areas have extra focus, security related requirements have a very large focus. 
Financial transactions, ethical compliance, anti-corruption etc., we always have a large focus 
on these". 
One of the respondents point to functions such as Global Mobility, and the distance between 
Norway and the rest of the organisation as factors that minimize the actual change.  
"I guess so (Being a larger execution framework). But there is still something I don't 
understand, and this is the organisation called Global Mobility. They are in a way more 
important for us in terms of rule setting, in practice at least. (..) It's almost like Norway in the 
60s. Decision makers and systems like Global Mobility have to be very precise and systematic, 
but they also have to have some understanding that things are different. But, the acceptance 
for this is bigger now at least".  
Design & Implementation 
Our findings show that the process of identifying relevant documents has been a smooth 
process. Although, according to some of our respondents, it was a rather overwhelming task 
to begin with. Our respondents mention that they have been able to have their say in most of 
the process.  
"I think the process has been ok. I have approached it in a pragmatic way. I think, in the 
beginning, it seemed very overwhelming because there was so much in the system. Thousands 
of governing documents and then we got the message that "ok, now you are accountable". (..) 
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I got a spreadsheet with thousands of documents and my reaction was something like "Okay, 
yes, when am I going to find time reading through all these?" But they did a very good job 
cleaning this from centrally, reducing the number by a rather large amount. I delegated to my 
team and asked everyone to go through the documents within their area, and the first question 
should be "Is this relevant for our country?". 
However, there are some issues where the line has requested a deviation from a document 
without a result.   
"We have operated with central requirements where we have had problems regarding our 
view. An example is the use of planes with one pilot for example, which is totally normal 
domestic routes. And then we have a requirement in Statoil stating that this is not allowed. 
We've had a process with our central air-safety people who have said no to us, making our 
lives much more difficult. So these are the kind of processes that we have with corporate".  
5.4 User Interpretation: RM100 
The respondents in this part of our empirical findings represent Group 3: Four people from 
the function and Group 4: Five country managers (See section 3.3 – The sample).  
On their use of RM100 
The country managers all expressed that they review the reports RM100 produces on a regular 
basis with the rest of their country management team. This is done to get an overview of the 
current risk picture. 
“We go through this risk matrix every couple of weeks. We don’t every two weeks go through 
all the seven steps, though. Often it’s just to talk about where we are in the business and to do 
a cross check to whether the risk matrix is reflecting where we are in the business. But from 
time to time we’ll take a deeper dive into that risk matrix and then that’s more following those 
seven steps”.   
The reports are also used in an attempt to highlight which challenges face the country office 
in the future.  
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“We will always look at something outside of what we are looking at now that are important. 
Should we add more and new things, is there anything happening in our business that means 
that we should add a new risk to that picture, or is there something that is more or less clear 
that should be taken out of the risk picture so that we really make it a "leaping" tool for the 
business side. I think that is...for us, in such an office, this is the most useful way of using this 
tool”.  
Further, the country managers also expressed that aggregations of the reports from RM100 are 
used to develop the country’s risk map. They are responsible for delivering this to Statoil’s 
corporate leadership twice a year. Because a country risk map includes information on all of 
the unit’s different operations, two of the respondents emphasise that the country managers 
have an important role in aligning everything that is being reported on. This requires a good 
overview of the country’s risk management assessments.  
“I formally sit within DPI, but we make sure that it covers NPR, exploration and the whole 
operation. So that’s really my job to make sure that on a country-wide basis we are ensuring 
that we are covering the entirety of Statoil’s operation”.  
All of the country managers emphasised that they are well aware of what the RM100 procedure 
consists of and how it works. However, it varies how involved they get in the RM100 
procedures that other members of their country unit are responsible for producing. Where 
some only read and review the final outcomes of the reports to get a richer understanding of 
their country’s risk picture, others choose to play a more active part in deciding what should 
be the focus points in the different risk assessments.  
Two of the respondents expressed that they are quite active regarding defining what should be 
the focus points of the risk assessment procedures.  
“We will go through every single risk in the risk matrix every quarter. We go through the risk 
radar and emerging issues and also make updates. And of course, this largely defines what 
will be focused upon by the rest of the management committee. At least for the risks, I decide 
to be directly involved in and take responsibility for. Other risks I might delegate so that others 
can focus upon those in their units”. 
“Although the team doesn’t get involved in all of the seven steps day in and day out, when this 
whole product is reviewed and presented in the meeting, there is always conversation around 
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the context. Why is this so high? Why is this is so low? This is the context we’re operating in; 
this is how things are etc.”.  
The respondent that expressed the highest degree of involvement had quite newly been 
redeployed. Through a previous role in Statoil’s exploration and production team, she had 
played an important part in the creation process of RM100 by giving advice on how it should 
be designed.  
“I am very active in this process, probably a bit too much. It may be because of my previous 
role; I don’t know. But everyone is affected by their history, right…The foundation of the work 
will usually be done before I look at it, and that’s ok. But I will typically get involved by asking 
questions such as: have you checked this, have you checked that, etc.”.   
However, one of the respondents explained that he is not concerned with how the reports are 
produced. Instead, he relies upon what he is provided with from and uses them for both 
managing risks as well as for producing the country risk map.  
“You know, to be fairly honest. This is done by the finance and control manager. She is using 
this system of course. Personally, I use this more like a management tool. We have a lot of 
different types of risk. Everything from political risk, technical risk, risk for security, and all 
these things. Of course, she usually runs this as a preparation for all the meetings. Then she 
brings up this...typically every month we have a look at that risk matrix, and she brings up all 
that is on this map”.  
RM100’s as an efficient procedure for risk assessments  
One of corporate risk team's intentions behind introducing RM100 was to create a simpler and 
more efficient process for risk assessments. Generally speaking, the respondents expressed 
that they are positive to the effects that the new procedure has had so far. They believe that 
the procedure provides them with a clear and concise recipe for assessing risk.  
“The procedure has become simpler and much more to the point. And the guide that comes 
with it, the one telling you what to do when has become much better. So it’s been good! It’s 
not all perfect, there is still room for improvement, but we are definitely moving in the right 
direction”.  
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Two of the country managers also emphasised that it is now simpler to get an overview of the 
whole risk picture and therefore also to know which risks should be prioritised when.  
“A more concise procedure makes it easier to know when things should be lifted further up in 
the system. We’re more aware of when a something is marked red; it must be lifted. Previously, 
the impression was that everything was quite chaotic and unclear. Now things are more 
standardised and structured”.  
“For me, it helps to have some clarity of what the procedure looks like rather than sitting in 
a room thinking: What are our big risks? The steps are a useful way to the right conclusions 
on what we should prioritise”.  
Respondents representing functions in different countries also expressed that they see the 
benefits RM100 has had on the organisation. They believe RM100 contributes to making 
Statoil more capable of dealing with the risks that exist.  
“I think everything has just become much simpler. Previously, we’ve had too much 
coordination of the coordinators”.  
“RM100 tells you exactly what needs to be taken into consideration when establishing the 
context. I would say that it helped our different risk assessment teams when establishing the 
context. Because in these environments they tend to think about the technical aspects, but they 
sometimes forget about local communities or other stakeholders or media or any stakeholder 
that kind of has the potential to impact risk is probably part of those guidelines. There is now 
a template for how to do that”.  
RM100’s standardised reporting format 
Both country managers and people from the functions expressed that they see many positive 
sides regarding the standardisation RM100 brings to risk assessment reports in Statoil. 
Amongst other things, when risk is to be communicated in such a diverse organisation and at 
so many different levels, they believe it to be beneficial that everyone agrees on certain formats 
for doing so.  
“The biggest change for us is for everybody to understand that we operate under the same 
principles. We implement RM100 and the higher principles that you will define the context, 
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assess the risk etc. Everyone will have to do this wherever you are. And this is very easy to go 
with because it is a common sense process for anyone”.  
Furthermore, the respondents also stated that RM100’s standardised reporting formats would 
probably make it easier for those in the corporate leadership to understand and assess the risks 
that are communicated from below.  
“We understand that the Statoil board and the corporate leadership need a risk map they can 
relate to…RM100 simplified things on a certain level, on the corporate and business area 
level that is. This is a result of us all now applying the same formats. This wasn’t the case 
before”.  
Although the respondents stated that RM100 brings a standard format for risk assessment, 
many indicated that the procedure is capable of catering for the many individual needs that 
exist in such a diverse organisation.   
“Yes, I don’t see any conflict in it all. You can ask many of the same questions but get very 
different answers, and that will again allow you to direct your focus to what you perceive to 
be the biggest risks”.  
“I’ve never felt that the system is in anyway restricting how we think about risk. So I don’t feel 
like we need to think about risk in a particular process frame. It’s more: what are the risks in 
the business and how do we best communicate that within the RM100 process. It is consistent 
with the size of impact and degree of risk and those sought of elements. So no, I don’t see that 
the standardisation and the system limit our ability to bring up the correct risks”.  
They also expressed that they believe RM100 is relevant regardless of the country the user is 
operating in. Hence, it is able to cater for a variety of contexts. 
“In a way, we have methods for addressing the different issues that appear in the different 
countries. And you’ll get different answers in the different countries as well. And from that, 
you’ll decide the different actions you need to take in order to manage risk. The base of the 
procedure is the same, though. The same questions dealing with the same issues in Russia and 
Tanzania, but of course, you have a completely different context in Russia than in Tanzania”  
All of the respondents emphasise RM100’s focus on standardisation also makes it easier to 
discuss and compare risk assessment across the organisation.  
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“But if you look at it as comparing, I’m sure that almost everyone is using the same kind of 
thinking now so that it is all fairly comparable. This is perhaps the most important thing…But 
if you are going to make a decision, and we see this a lot now, because now we discuss a lot 
like: Should we invest in Russia or should we invest in Brazil. Then of course risk is a part of 
it. So then being able to compare, and having the same kind of yardstick in a way, this really 
helps us. It helps us to be more systematic and better in comparing things. I think this is a very 
important improvement”.  
They also expressed that operating with comparable reports provides them with a better 
opportunity of discussing risk with employees in other parts of the organisation.  
“We will probably now be looking at a better product and be more able to talk about it all 
with other entities within Statoil and communicate better with the corporate team in Norway. 
Because the tool is standardised we’re now talking the same language which makes the risk 
communication much more fluid and clearer”.  
Although they all generally supported the standardisation RM100 brings, they also expressed 
concern regarding what would happen if the organisation become too reliant on standardised 
reports and scales when assessing risk. One country manager pointed out that the organisation 
could end up losing the necessary detail level when evaluating risk.  
“You have to look at it in detail in all of this as well, though. And the devil is really in the 
detail here. And here you really need to look at the detail. And even that is very subjective. 
But for example, it looks like there is much less risk in Venezuela than in Russia. And if you 
look at that you start wondering whether one really can compare things in this way. So I think 
that is a big problem. And this is really some of the key challenges I think for making a system 
like this”.  
Others emphasised that operating with a standardised scale when comparing risk across the 
organisation could potentially lead to people miss-interpreting the underlying risk.  
“Everyone needs to understand that it’s very easy to misinterpret these tables and matrixes. 
If it’s yellow or green, what does it actually mean? You see red in Russia and red in Brazil, 
but are they comparable? There is a need for qualitative input as well…To think you can 
calibrate by saying it is red or a 3,5, that’s not enough. You have to dig deeper than that”.  
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Instead, they argued that RM100 should be more concerned with highlighting the relevant 
risks across the organisation in a standardised format.  
“That I can say that from my perspective the purpose of the risk matrix is basically to highlight 
particular issues. Whether it is described as a three or a four doesn’t really make any 
difference, to be honest. It’s just more a question of making sure that the risk is getting 
sufficient attention and action to deal with it”.  
One country manager pointed to another way that the standardised format can lead to the loss 
of a necessary detail level. He explained how RM100 forces the users to categorise risk in a 
way that sometimes loses touch with the reality of the situation that is being reported on.  
“As soon as you introduce a risk element categorised as a safety risk, it goes to the top of the 
risk list. So I can have a traffic safety risk at the top because there’s a risk of injury or loss of 
life involved. But most likely, something like that will never happen, especially after mitigation. 
Expats aren’t allowed to drive cars etc. At the same time, though, I can be involved in a trial 
where I can lose hundreds of millions, but that will come way down on the risk list because 
issues such as traffic security go way above immediately. And then when I have to explain this 
to my boss or to in a DPI-setting, it all becomes such a waste of time. Why it’s like that, I 
really don’t know”.  
Design and implementation  
The respondents shared mixed experiences regarding to what degree they had been allowed to 
voice their opinion regarding how RM100 should function and be designed. 
Some of the respondents, both country managers and function representatives, expressed that 
they had been sufficiently included in the design processes leading up to the implementation.  
“Yes, we’ve been involved in the discussions about how the procedure should look like and be 
used. We were allowed to voice our opinions, so I don’t feel that this is something that has 
been pushed on to us. We are well aware of it and accept it all. But there were, of course, a 
lot of discussions, for example regarding if this should primarily be used by the project people 
or by the central risk team”.  
“A bit, yes. That was because corporate leadership initiated a project where we were to look 
at how to manage above ground non-technical risk. I was in charge of this project. We spent 
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a lot of time talking to other companies and organisations to see how they deal with non-
technical above ground risk, and some of these learning points were included in RM100”.  
Others did not feel the same degree of involvement in the design process. They expressed that 
they had not been invited to contribute at all and knew little about it before their country office 
were told to implement it.  
On the whole, the both the country managers and function people expressed that they 
understood why the corporate risk felt the need to implement a new procedure for risk 
assessments and that the rationales behind had been sufficiently communicated.  
“For me, I think the most important reason was that our risk management procedure had 
become too much of an administrative task...We spent far too little time trying to understand 
the risks and on trying to agree how important the risks are and what we should focus on”.  
“Well, the implementation campaign made it very clear how this RM100 links to the FR08 
risk management within the company. And to be honest the campaign was pretty…we do 
understand the protocol and the importance of managing risk as a business here. Repetition, 
people safety, business deliverables and the regulatory frame we’re working in. The whole 
context we’re working within makes us very aware of the importance of managing risk as a 
company. It’s a survival question, it’s part of the business”. 
However, one of the respondents who had not felt that he had been allowed to voice his 
opinions during the design process of RM100 and who also expressed that he did not see how 
the process had changed how risk is dealt with in the organisation, was not as sure about the 
intentions.  
“I don’t really know why. Perhaps they thought that it was necessary to have a fresh look at 
it. I don’t really know what the perception is elsewhere. I don’t know what a 40-year-old 
leader working in Stavanger is thinking about honestly speaking. I feel that where I am, in a 
manager group where I’ve been over the last 5-7 years, this is a constant concern…Most of 
the time, most of what we talk about is not about: we have to do this and this, or did you really 
worry about this and this. It is very much about the big and endless picture. And to organise 
these things and try to do the right things. Not to get overwhelmed by it all is really so 
important”.  
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Although none of the respondents had received direct training from the corporate risk team, 
they all believed to have received sufficient information and training regarding how RM100 
is to be used through other corporate risk team initiatives.    
One of the country managers’ expressed she had thought the procedure to be slightly confusing 
to begin with, fearing that this would be yet another complex and over detailed risk matrix. 
However, she thought it was easy to contact teams of the corporate to receive the necessary 
training. Furthermore, she believed her function representative from SSU was well informed 
and able to educate others around her if necessary.  
A representative from the one of the function was enthusiastic in regards to how the corporate 
risk team have gone about making sure everyone receives the necessary information. Although 
there was no direct training from the corporate level, he expressed that the e-learning module 
had been more than adequate.  
“And of course the corporate team has put together a very fine e-learning training package 
which we used earlier this year to roll out the procedure, that was very helpful. And we are in 
the process of figuring out the different detailed tools needed to make RM100 happen”. – 
Canada, representative from the function 
Finally, the country managers also expressed that they are content with the available support 
from discipline experts from the functions and see them as a useful resource available to them 
if necessary.  
“There are no exact rules for how we should discuss the different topics in the risk matrix. It 
varies. So it’s flexible whether you only do it with the management committee or if you include 
others in the discussion. We’ve also discussed that we should become even better to involve 
the discipline experts when necessary. The function experts who have the expertise and 
experience, right. So it should be ok to think that you can discuss things with the same group 






In this chapter we will conduct an analysis based on our empirical findings and the information 
presented in our background chapter. Building on this, we will firstly aim to provide answers 
to our two sub-questions: 
1. What influence does decreased formalisation have on how the users interpret the 
Management Control system? 
 
2. What influence does increased formalisation have on how the users interpret the 
Management Control system? 
 
Drawing on conclusions from our sub-questions, we will attempt to answer our overall 
research question:  
How does the introduction of two contradictory formalisations influence the users’ 
interpretation of the Management Control System in an organisation?  
Malmi & Brown argue (2008) that the type and degree of formalisation is consistently an 
important and deciding factor for how the Management Control System (MCS) is interpreted. 
By applying Adler & Borys’ (1996) framework, which argues that formalisations will be 
interpreted as either enabling or coercive depending on whether they promote a deskilling or 
usability logic, we will study how the introduction of two contradictory formalisations 






6.1  What influence does decreased formalisation have on 
how the users interpret the Management Control System? 
When exploring how decreased formalisation influences the interpretation of the MCS, we 
study Statoil's introduction of MS Roadmap. We will firstly analyse how the corporate 
operational staff intended that the decreased formalisation should be interpreted, before 
looking at how the users interpreted it. By comparing the two, we aim to gain insight in which 
mechanisms influence the overall interpretation of the MCS. 
The corporate operational team’s intentions: MS Roadmap 
Repair 
Our findings show that one of the intentions behind MS Roadmap was to enlarge The 
Execution Framework. According to Adler & Borys (1996), managers who are afraid of 
deviations will implement a deskilling approach and design equipment “..as to reduce the 
possibility of shirking” (Adler & Borys, 1996, p.70). Our findings show that MS Roadmap, in 
some ways, is the result of Statoil acknowledging a minimised or even non-existent latitude 
as a result of a focus on standardisation and safety. Both governing documents and process 
owners can be seen as deskilling design unless implemented well. Especially, the process 
owner can be seen as a way for management to separate routine tasks from improvement tasks, 
which, according to Adler & Borys can be classified as a deskilling approach.  
One of our findings shows that the management intended to allow for a more enabling 
approach when designing the new management system. According to Adler & Borys (1996), 
repair is one of the important features of enabling design. We find some distinctive features 
of MS Roadmap that can be characterised as a feature of enabling repair. First, the removal of 
process owners reduces the distinction between routine tasks and improvement tasks. As 
mentioned, the intention has been to give a larger degree of autonomy to the Business Areas 
(BAs), involving them in the decisions where the process owner used to have primacy. 
According to Adler & Borys, one effect of this will be that the users of the system, i.e., the 
BAs, will be able to take part in the "repair" of contingencies and thus increases their 
understanding of the system. This is in line with what Statoil's intentions were; increasing the 
efficiency as well as the understanding of the system. 
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Further, MS Roadmap is intended to be a better "fit" for each country, by allowing each BA 
in cooperation with the function, to identify documents relevant to them. According to Adler 
& Borys (1996), an enabling repair design should include “..strong formal and informal 
incentives encouraging workers to identify and propose improvements in methods” (Adler & 
Borys, 1996, p.71). The point is to have procedures that facilitate responses to real work 
contingencies.  
Thus, we conclude that the intention of MS Roadmap is to move the management system in 
this direction - enabling repair.  
Internal Transparency 
One of Statoil's findings before MS Roadmap was that the understanding of the management 
system was very dependent on the local manager. As a result, engaging managers in MS 
Roadmap has been important. This has been done by making sure that each manager is well 
supported during the implementation process as well as by communicating best practices and 
success stories across the organisation. These are factors intended to make sure that the BAs 
not only implemented the changes but did so in the best possible manner. Our respondents 
emphasise the fact that MS Roadmap will lead to a better understanding of the documents 
used. This was one of the primary intentions behind MS roadmap. Understanding the system 
of which one is using is an example of an enabling feature when speaking of internal 
transparency. Thus, the focus on understanding governing documents will enable employees 
to use these as a tool rather than a "set of hurdles,” (Adler & Borys, 1996).  
In place of the process owners, the COO is now responsible for improvements across the BAs 
when needed. The intention has been to drive improvements on a higher level and leave the 
accountability for more specific improvements to the BAs. As opposed to earlier, all 
improvements from the COO shall now be done with acceptance from the BAs. Consistent 
with Adler & Borys (1996), making a larger part of the management system an interactive one 
for the BAs will increase their understanding of the system but also allow for a more efficient 
use of the system.  
In addition, the different country managers are now allowed to identify and propose changes 
to the content of governing documents. Involving the users in the development process in this 
way leads to acceptance of the changes and facilitates internal transparency, according to 
Wouters & Wilderom (2008) and Glew et.al (1995).  
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We conclude that according to our respondents from corporate, MS Roadmap has some 
features that can be described as enabling when speaking of internal transparency. 
Global Transparency 
Though the changes in MS Roadmap are intentioned to enlarge the employees’ knowledge of 
the management system, corporate is usually talking about knowledge of how the system fits 
the BA, and less about the broader picture – an important feature of enabling global 
transparency according to Adler & Borys (1996). The structure of MS Roadmap specifies that 
the line manager (country manager) is accountable for a restricted geographical area. Though 
this facilitates being in line with and knowing the common strategy of the firm, it also means 
that you do not necessarily have to focus on how the other countries operate. 
We conclude that MS Roadmap, as intended by corporate, does not directly include any new 
usability features when speaking of global transparency.  
Flexibility 
The most important feature regarding flexibility is the process of identifying governing 
documents relevant to the BAs. By allowing this, MS Roadmap facilitates the BA to deviate 
from documents that do not make sense in their environment. Further, the MS Roadmap 
process intends to produce more tailor-made documents for the BAs, asking them to actively 
participate in creating new documents or changing existing ones when needed - this is in line 
with Adler & Borys’ (1996) usability logic.  
According to our interviews, corporate acknowledge that the existing management system led 
to too many deviations and was not flexible enough. The Norwegian way of operating was not 
necessarily the best way in another country. Acknowledging that deviations happen and seeing 
these as a chance to make improvements is a clear usability feature in regards to Adler & 
Borys’ (1996) concept of flexibility.  
Speaking of flexibility; removing the process role is a move that can be described as inherently 
enabling as the increased accountability is intentioned to come with a greater flexibility. 
However, the addition of the new COO-organisation does imply that there is a wish to keep 
some control and drive standardisations if needed. Our respondents highlight the fact that the 
COO-organisation shall only drive standardisations with acceptance from the BAs. Further, it 
is intended only to drive standardisations on a "higher level". 
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These changes make it easier for the employees to make deviations and changes to the system 
– important factors when speaking of enabling flexibility, according to Adler & Borys (1996). 
We conclude that the intentions of the MS Roadmap in regards to flexibility can be described 
as a usability approach concerning flexibility. MS Roadmap is intended to give the line an 
increased autonomy as well as facilitating changes in the system where it is needed. 
Implications 
In summary, we conclude that MS Roadmap is largely intended to make the management 
system more enabling. Both the removal of process owners and the reduction of the number 
of governing documents are designed to create a more flexible system for the users and 
ultimately lead to increased effectivity in operations. Further, we regard the intentions of 
making MS Roadmap a more understandable system as well as involving the users in the 
development process to be in line with what Adler & Borys (1996) refer to as an enabling 
features.   
We conclude that the intentions behind MS Roadmap clearly emphasise enabling features. 
Further, we find that the degree of formalisation is intended to be as low as the individual 
operations and countries allow, thus, using the framework presented by Adler & Borys (1996), 
we conclude that the corporate intention was to create an organic type of organisation (see 







Figure 13: MS Roadmap – Corporate’s intentions 
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The users’ interpretation: MS Roadmap  
Repair 
We find that the country managers appreciate that they can make changes to the documents in 
order to suit their environment. In other words, they feel there is an opportunity to fix the 
system when there are contingencies – an important feature of enabling repair (Adler & Borys, 
1996).  
Our respondents tell us that the removal of the process owner role has allowed the country 
managers to participate in decisions about standardisations and influence these in a larger way 
than before. However, we also find that the COO position and the function do limit to what 
extent the country managers feel that they can influence decisions. Even though the country 
managers have primacy, they find themselves in situations where there are technical 
discussions, making it difficult to say no for those who do not have a technical background. 
But, what we find is that the country managers now feel that they can ask the function to come 
up with a cheaper solution or find a different solution. In other words, we conclude that MS 
Roadmap makes it easier for the users to influence the design of the procedures to make them 
fit the real work environment in which they work. According to Adler & Borys (1996), this is 
a feature of enabling repair.  
All of our country managers agree that a lot of the procedures before MS Roadmap used to be 
very “Norwegian” (i.e. the documents are made from a Norwegian mind-set, meaning that 
they do not always fit the context in other countries). Now, they agree that it seems as one has 
acknowledged this fact, making it easier for the country managers to say no to standardisations 
or to change details in them to make them fit their country. However, even though this has 
become better, we find that the disconnect still exists. First, some of our respondents describe 
the COO organisation as “very Norwegian”. Second, some of our respondents highlight that 
those who make procedures has “a lack of being present” and thus a lack of knowledge about 
conditions in the different countries abroad. This leads to procedures that do not fit the 
organisation.  
Still, the country managers and the local functions agree that it is now easier to achieve 
acceptance for the changes that they propose, as long as it is a risk-based approach. Even 
though a lot of the standardisations still come across as “Norwegian”, it is now easier to get 
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approval for changes proposed by the line. Thus, we conclude that the repair features of MS 
Roadmap are perceived as enabling by the users, but only to some extent. The support roles 
surrounding them still has a lot to say and can be categorised as a way to divide routine and 
repair tasks. 
Internal Transparency 
We find that the country managers appreciate that they were invited to take part in the process 
of reducing the number of governing documents. The fact that the users have been involved 
in the development process will according to Wouters & Wilderom (2008) and Glew et.al 
(1995) increase the likelihood of them interpreting the system as internally transparent.  
Our respondents tell us that they find the documents more relevant now than what they used 
to. Thanks to the reduction, they no longer have to relate to a large number of irrelevant 
procedures and standards. Some of the managers tell us that the reduced documents were never 
used, but these still think that the reduction has made the system more relevant to them. As a 
result, they can now do some tasks much faster than earlier.  
The process of identifying relevant documents was quite a demanding task to begin with, 
according to some of the country managers. However, they respond that the co-operation with 
the corporate operational staff has made the process simpler and smoother. Whenever a 
problem or question has come up, they have been put in contact with the correct people to 
guide them. Thus, we find that there has been good communication in the process. This is 
consistent with Adler & Borys (1996), who state that a usability design should "...provide users 
with visibility into the processes they regulate by explicating its key components and by 
codifying best practice routines" (Adler & Borys, 1996, p.72). 
Further, we find that the process has been welcomed by the country managers. The disconnect 
between the governing documents and the actual environment in which those we have talked 
to are working in was indeed an irritation. They all feel, although to some different extent, that 
the system is more relevant now and easier to work with. Thus, we conclude that the country 
managers now have a better understanding of the system. These factors can be described as 
enabling in terms of internal transparency.  
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Global Transparency 
All of our respondents seem to have an understanding of Statoil's strategy and how they fit in 
the organisation and thus how they contribute. However, we find that there is a difference in 
terms of knowledge of the broader organisation. Some of our respondents seemingly have a 
good understanding of how other countries operate, while others seem to have a narrow focus 
on the area of for they are is responsible. 
Even though there are meetings where support roles and country managers attend, they are not 
necessarily intended to facilitate a broader knowledge of how other parts of the organisation 
operate.  
We find that the knowledge about other areas of the organisation seem to be a result of whether 
the person has had other positions in Statoil earlier and his or hers own general interest on the 
matter, and less a result of the features introduced with MS Roadmap. 
Flexibility 
We find that the perceived flexibility when working with governing documents varies. Some 
see the documents as absolute, while others have a more nuanced view placing a larger 
emphasis on compliance with security and risk while being more lenient in regards to other 
types of documents. Further, some of our respondents state that it is much harder for anyone 
to demand that he or she do processes differently now, with the MS Roadmap.  
At the same time, we find that the respondents appreciate the added accountability by 
removing the process owners. Though the perceived change in accountability differs between 
the respondents, they all agree that the removal has increased their flexibility as they now 
participate in discussions and have primacy in regards to what documents they use and what 
documents to deviate from. The fact that they now have their people verifying the proposed 
documents and choose whether or not to deviate from a document or not is in line with 
enabling flexibility. According to Adler & Borys (1996), this will lead to “..the result that the 
engineers can now take short-cuts without resorting to workarounds" (Adler & Borys, 1996, 
p.74) . This is confirmed by our respondents who emphasise that certain processes involving 
deviations now take much less time to approve. 
However, even though the country managers have primacy in regards to governing documents 
with MS Roadmap, we find that there are still some deviations that are either very hard or 
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impossible to get approved. According to our respondents, the support roles sometimes 
enforces their role when the country manager wants to deviate to change the documents so 
that they "make more sense" in their environment. Examples include not being allowed to 
travel by plane unless there are two pilots in a country where all the main routes are operated 
by single-pilot planes and salary freezes in countries with high inflation. 
Thus, we conclude that MS Roadmap has some enabling features in regards to flexibility. At 
the same time, there are still irritations in regards to the denial of certain deviations that does 
not make sense to the country managers. Still, our main finding when speaking of MS 
Roadmap and flexibility is that the managers feel that there now is larger acceptance for 
deviating – this is in-line with Adler & Borys’ (1996) enabling flexibility feature. 
Implications 
We find that the country managers describe several features of MS Roadmap that we 
categorise as enabling. First, MS Roadmap has given the BAs the chance to be involved in a 
“clean-up” of the management system, which is also interpreted as an invitation to repair the 
system in the future. Further, the primacy to identify and decide whether a document is 
relevant now that the process role is gone can be described as an enabling flexibility. We also 
find that the changes have made the country managers more aware of the system in itself, thus 
enabling internal transparency. However, we do not find a lot of features specifically related 
to global transparency.  
On the contrary, we find that some of the country managers feel that the enabling features are 
limited to some extent by supporting roles. This leads us to conclude that although enabling, 
there are situations where the primacy of country managers does not seem to apply. All in all, 
though, we argue that the country managers see MS Roadmap as enabling, but with certain 
limitations such as a very “Norwegian” COO-function and disconnect in regards to the 
adaptability to local environment – features that can be described as coercive.  
In summary, we conclude that MS Roadmap is interpreted by our respondents as a “step in the 
right direction” in terms of enabling features. We argue further that this step is somehow 
limited by the perceived primacy of supporting roles in the organisation. Based on our 
findings, we can place the user interpretation in the framework presented by Adler & Borys 
(1996) (see figure 14). Coming from a system with a significant amount of coercive 
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formalisation, MS Roadmap is clearly a change towards an organic organisation. Our findings 
show that the degree of formalisation is interpreted as lower, although still present. 
Furthermore, the formalisation in place has several features interpreted as enabling. Lastly, we 
find that there still is a disconnect between supporting roles in the organisation and the BAs, 
thus, there are some features that we argue as coercive. Based on this, we place the user 
interpretation as borderline organic, close to being autocratic in terms of the type of 
formalisation and close to enabling bureaucracy in terms of the degree of formalisation.  
 
 
Figure 14: MS Roadmap – Users’ interpretation 
 
Comparison of the corporate’s intentions and the users’ interpretation 
We find that the management’s intention was to make the MCS more enabling. Even though 
our respondents agree that this has been a push in the right direction, we find that there are 
still features interpreted as coercive by some employees.  
First, there is a distinction in terms of repair features. Although the country managers see the 
MS Roadmap as more enabling than earlier, the COO position and other support functions are 
still experienced as very “Norwegian”. The country managers feel that they have more 
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accountability now than earlier, meaning that they are in a position where they can influence 
and decide which documents to use in a larger way. However, some mandatory 
standardisations and decisions from the COO and other supporting roles still feel very 
Norwegian to our respondents. 
We find little distinction regarding internal transparency. All our respondents seem to agree 
that the system is easier to work with now and thus leads to a better understanding of the 
documents – one of the main intentions behind MS Roadmap. The fact that they were involved 
in the development process of the system is thought to have contributed to this interpretation. 
Although some of the country managers seem to have some or even extensive global 
knowledge, we cannot link this to the features of MS Roadmap. 
Lastly, we find a distinction concerning features of flexibility. Again, the COO role and other 
support functions creates irritation among some of the country managers. However, the 
removal of the process owner role has given the country managers a bigger latitude in terms 
of deviations, and we argue that this is a feature of enabling flexibility. 
We find that the decreased formalisation, in this case, has both enabling and coercive features. 
First, we argue that enabling repair and flexibility lead to a larger execution framework. This 
is interpreted as a positive change by the country managers. However, in this case, supporting 
roles in the organisation limit the degree of the perceived latitude. Although the country 
managers see the people from the function as helpful, there is a certain degree of disconnect 
between these support roles and the country managers which lead to some coercive features.  
Further, we argue that less formalisation can give rise to a larger internal transparency. 
Minimising the number of governing documents and at the same time allowing the BAs to 
change the content to "tailor-make" a system for each BA seems to have increased the internal 
transparency of the system in place, we find. This leads to a positive interpretation as the 





As pictured above (figure 15), we find that the interpretation of the employees deviates 
somewhat from the intention of the management. First, the COO role is seen as more restrictive 
than originally intended. All of the employees regard the support roles in the organisation as 
very “Norwegian”, and several point specifically to a lack of presence. As a result, certain 
situations lead to these roles being interpreted as coercive. Thus, leading to a deviation. 
6.2 What influence does increased formalisation have 
on how the users interpret the Management Control 
System? 
When exploring how increased formalisation influences the interpretation of the MCS, we 
study Statoil’s introduction of RM100. We will firstly analyse how the corporate risk team 
intended that the increased formalisation should be interpreted, before looking at how it was 
interpreted by the users. By comparing the two, we aim to gain insight on which mechanisms 
influences the overall interpretation of the MCS.  
 
CORPORATE: USER: 
Figure 15: Ms Roadmap – Corporate’s intentions vs. Users’ interpretation 
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The corporate risk team’s intentions: RM100 
Repair  
The RM100 design implies that the user, namely the risk owner, is entirely responsible for 
conducting the necessary risk assessments. As the user has the final say in regards to what 
needs to be done, the initial design comes across as an autonomous process that adheres to 
Adler & Borys’ (1996) enabling repair logic. Without further analysis, it looks as if the risk 
owner is faced with a procedure that enables him to deal with any contingencies and where he 
is in charge of taking the necessary steps to ensure that the risk assessment process goes as 
planned.  
However, members of Statoil’s corporate risk team also explained that users are well 
supported by discipline experts throughout the process, who provide advice when users are 
faced with technically advanced tasks. The respondents also expressed that when the users are 
provided with advice from the discipline experts, they should have a good reason for not 
following. A procedure where users are initially asked to both conduct the risk assessment 
process and also to be accountable for it, but where they are expected to engage discipline 
experts whenever a technically complicated issue appears, is representative for what Adler & 
Borys’ (1996) define as a coercive deskilling approach. It would seem that RM100 users are 
assigned routine tasks that they are thought to be able to handle. However, when non-routine 
tasks that require a certain degree of technical competency appear, though, it is expected that 
the users call upon others for help.  
Having said that, the whole practice is in many ways understandable as risk assessment 
procedures in a large international oil and gas company are likely to require substantial 
amounts of technical understanding. It is, therefore, crucial for the user to receive technical 
advice if he is not sufficiently trained in the specific field. In light of Adler & Borys’ (1996) 
enabling repair logic, though, one might argue that Statoil should have created a process where 
the user has all the available tools to conduct the whole risk assessment regardless of any 
contingencies. Creating guidelines for every single risk assessment procedure could prove to 
be difficult for a company with such a diverse range of technically complicated procedures.  
In regards to this part of RM100 alone, we argue that the corporate risk team has designed a 
procedure in-line with what Adler & Borys (1996) refer to as a coercive repair logic. When 
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faced with a non-routine technical issue, the user must call upon others to help them instead 
of having the necessary tools available to overcome the contingency by themselves.  
Internal Transparency   
Before RM100 was fully implemented in the organisation, the corporate risk team invited 
members from the corporate level within the SSU function as well as previous function owners 
to give feedback. Both Adler & Borys (1996) and Wouters & Wilderom (2008) state that 
involving employees in the development process is likely to generate a positive attitude 
towards the new procedure. This is linked to Adler & Borys’ (1996) enabling internal 
transparency logic and implies that the corporate risk team provided those who were invited 
to give feedback with an understanding of the underlying theory of the process. However, by 
only including employees at the corporate level, the corporate risk team failed to involve those 
further down in the organisation who will be using who RM100. Adler & Borys (1996) do not 
go as far as saying that not giving employees insight into the development process applies to 
a coercive internal transparency logic. Having said that, the corporate risk team’s actions 
figures as a missed opportunity to ensure that the actual users of RM100 have an underlying 
understanding of the rationales behind the procedure. According to Adler & Borys (1996), this 
would have contributed to enabling internal transparency. Hence, we argue that the corporate 
risk team should have invited those who will be using RM100 to the feedback session, rather 
than only focusing on members of Statoil’s corporate body.  
The same can be said for when the corporate risk team held presentations about the new 
procedure. By choosing to focus on presenting for different leadership groups, as well as to 
members of the SSU-function, they missed out on the opportunity to explain the underlying 
rationales behind RM100 directly to many of those who will be using it. Instead, those who 
did receive the presentation were obligated to pass on their knowledge to others. One could 
argue that the Statoil organisation is far too large for it to be possible for the corporate risk 
team to explain RM100 to each and every one of the potential users. Having said that, the 
respondents did admit that the degree in which RM100 has been passed on further down the 
system has depended on who is sitting at the top. Hence, the corporate risk team have not been 
able to ensure enabling internal transparency across the whole organisation through these 
presentations alone. All in all, we argue that the corporate risk team should have focused on 
presenting RM100 directly to those who will be using the procedure, rather than only focusing 
on leadership groups and members of the SSU-function. This would have contributed to 
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ensuring that the users receive an understanding of the underlying rationales behind the 
procedure and would be in line with Adler & Borys’ (1996) concept of enabling internal 
transparency.  
The corporate risk team did take some other measures to ensure that RM100 and the rationales 
behind it reached the potential users. First of all, they created an extensive e-learning platform 
which anyone who will be using RM100 is expected to use, both now and in the future. 
Secondly, we find that the corporate risk team has worked hard to signal that they are prepared 
to come and present the procedure to anyone who requires it, upon which they have received 
several requests. Furthermore, they have also communicated openness to feedback by, 
amongst other things, including a feedback option as part of the RM100 platform. These are 
all initiatives that are in line what Adler & Borys (1996) state will lead to enabling internal 
transparency.  
Further, respondents from the corporate risk team described the measures they have taken to 
ensure that RM100 remains an internally transparent procedure in the future. This has been 
done by introducing strict rules for anyone from the corporate risk team wanting to add new 
requirements to the procedure. If desirable, anyone introducing a new requirement must put 
down a substantial amount of work for it to be accepted as part of RM 100. Not only is it 
mandatory that those potentially affected by the requirements are invited to give feedback, but 
several compulsory implementation activities must also be conducted. Involving the user in 
the design process through feedback sessions as well as focusing on a sufficient 
implementation process will, according to both Adler and Borys’ (1996) and Wouters & 
Wilderom (2008), lead to an enabling internal transparency logic. It is likely that this initiative 
from the corporate risk team will ensure that users have the necessary understanding of the 
underlying theory behind any new requirements that are introduced to RM100 in the future.  
In sum, we argue that the corporate risk team has clearly attempted to create enabling internal 
transparency through their different implementation initiatives. They are also aiming to keep 
it in this way in the future. However, we also claim that they should have concentrated some 
of their initial efforts even more so towards those who will be using RM100 instead of relying 
upon leadership and members of SSU to deliver the message. Having said that, it is important 
to keep in mind the context the corporate risk team operates in. Hence, reaching out to each 
and every RM100 user in such a large and diverse organisation is likely to be extremely 
challenging. 
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Global Transparency    
Through RM100, the corporate risk team have put substantial effort into ensuring that risk 
assessments are always conducted through standardised formats. One of the motivations 
behind this was to make it simpler to communicate risk across the organisation by making risk 
assessment reports more comparable across its different divisions. This was intended to 
simplify the process of reading and assessing the outcome of the reports. However, we also 
argue that the standardised formats will make it easier for RM100-users to interact with others 
in the organisation as they are now all approaching the task of risk assessments in the same 
way. Whether it was the corporate risk team’s direct intention or not, it has nonetheless made 
it possible for the users to actively interact with the broader system in which they are working 
within. This opens for discussion and cooperation across the organisation when conducting 
risk assessments and is in-line with what Ahrens & Chapman (2004) refer to as global enabling 
transparency.  
Flexibility  
Users of RM100 are obliged to perform seven steps and comply with nine absolute 
requirements. The corporate risk team has therefore introduced a substantially formalised 
approach to risk assessments in Statoil. Adler & Borys’ (1996) two-dimensional framework 
overcomes the conventional assumption that formalisation is a necessary evil that must be 
reduced to achieve high motivation. Instead, the discussion should be based on the “type” of 
formalisation. Hence, the relevant discussion is how the procedure is formulated and not 
whether RM100’s degree of formalisation is high or not.  
We argue that RM100 is designed in a way that is aligned with what Adler & Borys (1996) 
refer to as coercive flexibility where detailed steps and little decision-making latitude prevail. 
At an overall level, employees are obligated to conduct RM100 in situations where they expect 
that Statoil’s bottom line is at risk. They are required to follow the procedure’s seven steps, to 
comply with the nine requirements and to report in the available standardised formats. This is 
formulated as an unconditional requisite by the corporate risk team. If the users want to deviate 
from any of the requirements, they must apply to what is referred to as the requirement’s 
owner. According to the respondents from the corporate risk team, temporary dispensations 
are only given if there is a very good reason for it to be given. Permanent dispensations are 
only given if there are conflicting legal issues. Furthermore, the respondents from the 
corporate risk team also explained how the users must continue to conduct RM100 on the 
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specific project until they can present satisfactory results through the procedure’s evaluation 
steps. In cases where the visible results are not acceptable, the user must conduct a review and 
re-do the steps that are believed to have affected the process negatively. 
Implications 
In regards to Adler & Borys’ (1996) two-dimensional framework, we conclude that Statoil’s 
corporate risk team have intended to introduce an enabling procedure with a high degree of 
formalisation. Adler & Borys’ (1996) refer to this as enabling bureaucracy. However, as the 
mark in figure 16 suggests, we argue also that RM100 should only be considered as boarder-
line enabling.  
 
We view RM100’s design as one with many inherently coercive features. The procedure 
provides the users with little flexibility and requires discipline experts to involve themselves 
whenever a non-routine task appears. We therefore state that the actual design of RM100 is 
more concerned with forcing employee compliance than making employees feel facilitated 
or motivated by the rules and the systems in place.  
 
Figure 16: RM100 - Corporate's intentions 
However, we also acknowledge that the corporate risk team have put substantial effort into 
ensuring that the rationales behind RM100 are internally transparent. According to both 
Adler & Borys (1996) and Wouters & Wilderom (2008), this is likely to create a positive 
feeling towards the procedure. We argue that if the corporate risk team is successful in 
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communicating and generating acceptance for why there is a need for such a detailed and 
restrictive procedure for risk assessments, the users are likely to be left feeling both enabled 
and motivated by it. Next to this, we also claim that RM100 will lead to global transparency 
in the organisation. Being able to interact with others in the organisation is likely to be both 
motivating and useful for the user when conducting the risk assessment procedure. 
 
The users’ interpretation: RM100 
Repair  
As mentioned, when users are faced with technically advanced procedures, they are provided 
with advice from discipline experts which the corporate risk team expects them to follow. We 
state that in a situation where the users feel obliged to off-set the process they are accountable 
for whenever a technically challenging issue appears, implies a coercive interpretation of the 
formalisation on this matter. According to Adler and Borys (1996), this will lead to an 
inefficient procedure in the long-run, which is the exact opposite of what Statoil’s corporate 
risk team has stated they aim RM100 to be.  
However, if the users perceive the discipline experts as a useful asset they freely can call upon 
when needed complies with Adler & Borys’ (1996) enabling repair logic. In this situation, we 
argue that the discipline expert becomes a tool for the user so that they can ensure that the 
necessary risk assessments are conducted for both routine and non-routine tasks. 
Our findings show that country managers are content with the support they receive from the 
discipline experts from the functions when dealing with RM100, and see them as a useful 
resource available to them if necessary. Hence, the discipline experts become tools that are 
obtainable for the user when met by technically advanced issues. We, therefore, argue that the 
users have an enabling interpretation of their ability to conduct the RM100 procedure. They 
are equipped with the necessary tools regardless tasks’ complexity.  
However, in light of our findings, we also argue that there are certain aspects to RM100 that 
the country managers and function people interpret as coercive in regards to Adler & Borys’ 
(1996) repair feature. Although the respondents were in general positive to the standardised 
report format RM100 introduces, they also expressed concern that it will lead to risk being 
communicated at a detailed enough level. Adler & Borys (1996) argue that within a coercive 
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repair logic, managers interpret the existing formalisation in such a way that does not give 
them permission to modify procedures if they find it necessary. Because the respondents feel 
obliged to solely report within the standardised format instead of making what they believe to 
be the necessary alternation, we argue this aspect to RM100 facilitate a coercive repair logic.  
To summarise, we argue that RM100 facilitates both an enabling and coercive interpretation 
from the user’s perspective in regards to Adler & Borys’ (1996) repair logic. The respondents 
express that they are provided with the necessary tools to deal with any contingencies. 
However, they also feel required to follow the predefined procedure even if they believe there 
exist more sufficient approaches.  
Internal Transparency   
Our findings show that both country managers and people from the functions were pleased 
with the information and training they received in regards to the implementation of RM100. 
Although none of them had been trained directly by the corporate risk team, they all expressed 
that the necessary information had been provided through other initiatives, such as the e-
learning platform. Furthermore, one of the country managers also explained how easy it was 
for her to contact a member of the corporate risk team to receive further training. With this in 
mind, it is evident that the respondents are satisfied with the corporate risk team’s efforts in 
regards to ensuring that they are all well informed. We argue that the users’ feeling of being 
sufficiently educated in regards to how the new procedure works implies that they interpret 
RM100 as internally transparent.  
As a testament to the corporate risk team’s implementation efforts, the country managers 
expressed that they are well aware of how the procedure works. They all use it actively to get 
an overview of their specific country’s risk pictures as well as for producing the country risk 
map that they must deliver bi-annually to the corporate leadership. In general, both the country 
managers and the people from the functions stated that they understood the rationales behind 
why the corporate risk felt the need to implement a new procedure for risk assessments. 
Amongst other things, they believe it has had a positive effect on the organisation by turning 
risk assessments into a concise procedure that consists of clear instructions for how to 
approach the task. Furthermore, all the respondents saw the benefits behind the corporate risk 
team’s decision to make everyone use standardised formats when conducting RM100. At the 
same time, they also disputed the fact that this would limit their ability to use the procedure 
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within their country division and context. All of this supports an argument that the users 
interpret RM100 as internally transparent as it is evident that they both understand and feel 
comfortable with the procedure’s underlying logic.  
Our findings show that the degree it varies to which the country managers and the people from 
the functions were invited to give feedback on RM100 before it was fully implemented. One 
interesting outcome of our interviews, though, is that the respondent who expressed the highest 
degree of engagement in risk assessments beyond those they are responsible for producing 
themselves is also the person who was the most involved in the design process of RM100. 
Adler & Borys (1996) do not refer to the degree of which someone is involved beyond what 
is required as a sign of more or less internal transparency. However, it is nonetheless evidence 
of the benefits both Adler & Borys (1996) and Wouters & Wilderom (2008) claim that insight 
in the development process is likely to have.    
Global Transparency    
Our findings show that both country managers and people from the functions are appreciative 
of the fact that RM100 has made it easier to communicate risk across the organisation. The 
respondents expressed that the introduction of standardised formats and principles has made 
everyone more able to discuss and compare risk with other country divisions. RM100 has in 
other words provided the users with a useful opportunity to interact with the broader 
organisation and environment. We, therefore, argue that the users interpret RM100 as enabling 
in regards to what Ahrens & Chapman (2004) refer to as global transparency.  
Flexibility 
Our findings imply that both country managers and people from the functions regard RM100 
to be a mandatory procedure consisting of detailed steps, requirements and reporting formats 
that users are obligated to follow all the way. Furthermore, the respondents expressed that they 
view it as a concise procedure that tells the users exactly what needs to be done when assessing 
risk. We, therefore, argue that the users interpret RM100 as coercive in regards to Adler & 
Borys’ (1996) flexibility feature. The procedure consists of a detailed sequence of steps and 
minimises the reliance on the user’s skills.  
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Implications  
In regards to Adler & Borys’ (1996) two-dimensional framework, we conclude that the users 
interpret RM100 as an enabling procedure with a high degree of formalisation. Adler & Borys 
(1996) refer to this as enabling bureaucracy. However, as figure 17 indicates, we argue that 
the users regard RM100 to be a boarder-line enabling procedure.   
 
 
Figure 17: RM100 - Users' interpretation 
According to our analysis, the users interpret RM100 to be designed in a way that focuses on 
assuring the corporate risk team that the necessary measures are taken when assessing risk. It 
is a procedure with little degree of flexibility and where the users are also encouraged to stick 
to its detailed steps rather than designing their own methods. However, our findings also imply 
that the corporate risk team have been able to generate a positive attitude from the users 
towards the procedure. This has been done by communicating the rationales behind RM100’s 
design, through ensuring that the users are comfortable with using it and by making sure they 
have the necessary tools available to them when conducting the procedure. The fact that the 
procedure is thought of as globally transparent is also a contributing factor. Furthermore, we 
also argue that the observed effect would have been even more noticeable if the corporate risk 
team had involved the users in the procedure’s design phase to a greater extent. In sum, we 
conclude that even though the users register RM100’s deskilling features, they also believe 
that it enables them to conduct risk assessments with the necessary level of detail and 
precision. They are therefore also supportive of the procedure’s coercive features.  
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Comparison of the corporate risk team’s intentions and the users’ 
interpretation 
Our analysis implies that RM100 is both intended and interpreted as a coercively designed 
procedure that gives the corporate risk team necessary control over the organisation’s risk 
assessment procedures. However, we also argue that the corporate risk team’s implementation 
efforts have secured enabling internally transparency. The following has resulted in a situation 
where the users both understand and support the procedure’s underlying logic, and 
furthermore, its coercive features. 
We find that the corporate risk team has intended to limit the user’s repair opportunities by 
introducing discipline experts who intervene when a non-routine task emerges. However, in 
the case of the users, the discipline experts are regarded as a useful tool that helps them to deal 
with any contingencies. This is evidence of how RM100’s enabling internal transparency has 
generated acceptance for the procedure’s deskilling nature. 
In regards to Adler & Borys’ (1996) global transparency feature, we find no differences in the 
corporate risk team’s intentions and the user’s interpretation. Enabling discussion and 
cooperation across the organisation contributes to the users’ positive attitude towards the 
procedure. 
By way of summary, we argue that the underlying features of the increased formalisation that 
RM100 represents has contributed to an enabling interpretation of Statoil’s MCS. As figure 
18 implies, it is also evident that the users interpret the procedure in the same way as it was 
intended by the corporate risk team. There is little doubt that RM100 is a procedure with a 
high degree of formalisation and many coercive features. However, both the intended and 
interpreted internal and global transparency has generated the necessary support for RM100 





Figure 18: RM100 – Corporate’s intentions vs. Users’ interpretation 
  
6.3 How does the introduction of two contradictory 
formalisations influence the users’ interpretation of 
the Management Control System in an 
organisation?  
So far we have discussed how the introduction of MS Roadmap and RM100 have influenced 
the interpretation of Statoil’s Management Control System (MCS). Where the former 
represents an increase in formalisation, the latter, in contrast, represents a decrease. In this 
section, we will draw upon our learnings so far in order to answer our overall research 
question.  
In total, we find that how the introduction of two contradictory formalisations influences the 
users’ interpretation of the MCS depends on their inherent features. If designed in a way that 
promotes a usability approach, the MCS will be interpreted as enabling. If the opposite is true, 
the MCS will be interpreted as coercive and deskilling. This is in line with Adler & Borys’ 
(1996) framework which argues that it is not the degree of formalisation that influences how 
employees interpret the MCS, but the distinctive features of how rules and procedures are 
CORPORATE USER 
 103 
designed and implemented. Hence, we argue the MCS can be interpreted as both enabling and 
coercive regardless of how many rules and instructions that exist in the organisation  
Of the generic features that Adler & Borys (1996) promote will influence whether 
formalisation is interpreted as enabling or coercive, our findings suggest that the degree to 
which users experience internal transparency is of particular importance. Specifically, for our 
case study, this has made a substantial contribution to the overall enabling interpretation of 
MS Roadmap and RM100. In both cases, the fact that the users understand the underlying 
logic behind why the formalisations are designed as they are has led to the them accepting and 
supporting some of its more coercive features. To achieve internal transparency, there has 
generally been an emphasis on introducing efficient and concise formalisations that the users 
find simple to use. Further, the different corporate teams have worked hard to ensure that the 
users understand the underlying logic of the formalisations. This has been accomplished 
through a thorough implementation process that has focused on sufficient communication with 
the users and on providing them with extensive support. Also, where involving employees in 
the development process has contributed to the users interpreting MS Roadmap as internally 
transparent, it is highlighted as something that the corporate risk team should have ensured to 
a greater extent in regards to RM100. This is in line with findings of Wouters & Wilderom 
(2008) and Glew et.al (1995) 
Different interpretation of support roles 
In situations where enabling internal transparency is present, our findings suggest that 
increased and decreased formalisation can lead to different interpretations of the support roles 
that exist within an organisation. In our second sub-question, we concluded that enabling 
internal transparency has led to the users both accepting and supporting RM100’s deskilling 
features. They believe that the many rules and instructions that exist enable them to conduct 
risk assessments with a necessary detail level and precision. In this case, discipline experts are 
seen as a useful tool that helps the employees to comply with the procedure. Thus, when users 
understand and agree with the underlying logic for why there is a need for extensive rules and 
instructions, our findings imply that they interpret the support roles as a positive feature that 
helps them to comply with the procedure.  
However, in the case of MS Roadmap the supporting roles are not exclusively interpreted as 
an enabling function. In our first sub-question, we argued that the users saw the formalisation 
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as enabling internal transparency. Hence, they understood and agreed with the new system’s 
intentions of giving them increased decision-making latitude in order to increase efficiency. 
In this case though, the support roles represent a dichotomy where the users, on the one hand, 
feel that corporate have wanted to increase their freedom but have, at the same time, restricted 
it through introducing the support roles. Specifically, we find that the perceived decision-
making latitude is indeed larger, but the effect becomes reduced in situations where the support 
roles influence decisions in a way that conflict with the users’ opinions.  
This is an interesting observation as the support roles in this case have, in theory, the same 
function regarding primacy and involvement in both RM100 and MS Roadmap. We, therefore, 
argue that the difference in impact on the users’ interpretation is, in this case, a result of the 
degree of formalisation. This provides the users agreed with the underlying rationales behind 
the degree of formalisation in the first place. When the formalisation degree is high, the 
supporting roles are seen as a tool that helps the users to comply with the introduced 
formalisations. In the case of the opposite, we find that the support roles are often seen as a 
disturbing factor that limits the increased latitude that originally followed with the reduction 




7 Conclusion  
This chapter firstly presents a summary of the thesis. Further, we point to some of the study’s 
limitations as well as providing suggestions for future research. Finally, because the topic of 
this thesis is based on a request from Statoil, we conduct an extensive review of the 
implications we believe our findings will have specifically for the organisation.  
7.1 Summary  
This thesis contributes to literature with a case-study on the multinational corporation, Statoil. 
It therefore also adds a practical approach to Adler & Borys’ (1996) framework as called for 
by Ahrens & Chapman (2004). Further, by looking at the introduction of two contradictory 
formalisations to Statoil’s MCS, it contributes with a study of how organisations can 
implement different degrees of formalisation at the same time, as requested by Wouters & 
Wilderom (2008).  
This thesis has focused on answering the following research question: 
How does the introduction of two contradictory formalisations influences the users’ 
interpretation of the Management Control System? 
In order to do so, we have looked at how the introduction of decreased and increased 
formalisation influences the users’ interpretation of the Management Control System (MCS).  
Our findings indicate that they both lead to an enabling interpretation where the users are 
motivated by the rules and regulations that are in place, providing that their inherent features 
facilitate a usability approach. We therefore also find support for Alder & Borys’ (1996) 
framework which states that it is the design and implementation of the formalisation and not 
the degree of the formalisation that is the deciding factor for how the users view the 
formalisations in place.  
 
To facilitate a usability approach, there should be a focus on designing and implementing the 
formalisations so that they adhere to Adler & Borys’ (1996) generic features of enabling repair, 
internal and global transparency and flexibility. Of the four, our findings highlight enabling 
internal transparency as the most influential quality. This is because an understanding of the 
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underlying rationales seems to generate support for the formalisation as a whole. It can 
therefore create acceptance for the existence of coercive features as well. Involving employees 
in the development process is highlighted as a factor that has the ability to increase users’ 
interpretation of enabling internal transparency.    
Our study does point towards one area where the degree of formalisation has been a decisive 
factor for how the MCS is interpreted. We find that if there exists a high degree of 
formalisation, and the users deem this as necessary when performing their line of work, they 
are also positive to having support people who help them to achieve compliance with the many 
rules and instructions that exist. However, if there exists a low degree of formalisation and the 
users believe this to be the best solution, the support roles are seen as a feature that interferes 
with the decision-making latitude that exists when there are few prevailing rules and 
instructions.     
The study has had a top-down approach, meaning that we have looked at the introduction of 
the new formalisations from the corporate division’s perspective. Hence, we have throughout 
the study focused on how the users have interpreted corporate’s intentions behind the 
introduced formalisations.  
7.2 Limitations of the study and suggestions for 
future research 
Some interesting suggestions for further research have come up while writing this thesis. First 
of all, it is worth keeping in mind the limited scope that our study is based upon due to 
restrictions on time and resources. Hence, we believe that it would be interesting to interview 
more employees in a greater number of organisations so that it is possible to infer more about 
this topic.   
Our study has been conducted in an international context, as the employees that we 
interviewed were based in different countries.  This is emphasised by some of our respondents 
who use terms such as “Norwegian” and “disconnected” to describe features of the MCS. 
Though we have sought to analyse this through the framework presented by Adler & Borys 
(1996), we acknowledge that factors such as culture, distance and other implications of 
working in an international setting has not been taken into account. An interesting topic for 
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future research would be to consider how the influence of the MCS is influenced by an 
international context.   
In section 2.2, we refer to other factors that researchers highlight may have attitudinal effect 
on how employees interpret formalisations in a MCS such as goal congruence between 
management and employees, asymmetries in power, absence of “reality-check” and 
management’s handling of performance indicators  (Adler & Borys, 1996; Jordan & Messner, 
2012; March, 1994; Wouters & Wilderom, 2008). Considering that our study has been 
confined to Adler & Borys’ four generic and the role of involvement, it would be interesting 
to conduct further research on how these other features influence users’ interpretation of the 
MCS.  
We have looked at formalisation in the management control system and how it influences user 
interpretation. Another suggestion we have for future research is to conduct a quantitative 
analysis looking at how increased and decreased formalisation affect the bottom line. Amongst 
other things, it would be interesting to look at what type of formalisation is most beneficial to 
apply in a cost-reduction setting.  
This study has focused on an organisation that has newly introduced two formalisations. It has 
therefore paid a lot of attention to how the implementation procedures have generated an 
enabling interpretation. It would be interesting to conduct a study of the same organisation 
over time in order to research what needs to be done in order to facilitate an enabling 
interpretation also in the future. 
Finally, Adler & Borys (1996) highlight the need for further research on the roles of staffs in 
regards to formalisation. One of our findings is that different degrees of formalisation can lead 
to different interpretations of the support roles in an organisation. We therefore agree with 
Adler & Borys by arguing that it would be interesting to look at how roles such as HR and 




7.3 Implications for Statoil  
In total, we recommend Statoil to review the empirical findings, analysis and conclusions that 
we provide through this thesis. However, in this section we wish to remark upon some of the 
implications we believe that our findings have specifically for Statoil. 
MS Roadmap:  
First of all, our respondents seem to appreciate the change that MS Roadmap has brought. 
Further, although some saw the it as quite overwhelming to begin with, the implementation 
seems to have been well supported so far. However, we find some challenges and opportunities 
that should be approached.  
We find that reducing the amount of documents combined with the ability to “tailor-make” 
the content of certain documents increases the internal transparency of the system. The 
implication for Statoil is that that the employees now have a better overview of the governing 
documents. Although they did not use all of the documents before MS Roadmap, it is easier 
to know the content of 100 documents than 1500 documents. This is sure to be a driver of 
efficiency. However, we cannot as of now conclude whether or not the changes in the actual 
content of the documents will drive efficiency – it is too early in the process. What kind of 
changes in content are impacting effectivity the most? This question should be monitored 
closely by Statoil and will hopefully lead to best-practices and cases that can be communicated 
across the organisation. 
Further, all of the country managers explain that they experience, to different extents, the 
COO-organisation and other support roles as disconnected. The fact that we have only 
conducted with international country managers is sure to be a catalyst for this finding. 
However, this implies that there still is work to do in terms of communication and global 
transparency. There are cases where the country managers feel that there is a disconnect 
between what the support roles and country managers are being measured on, leading to 
unnecessary complications and inefficiency.  
Through our interviews we find evidence of a cultural change in regards to the execution 
framework, although just to some extent. The country managers state that they feel a larger 
accountability now. Especially, we find that the removal of process owners has increased the 
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country managers’ ability to influence the bottom line. Our respondents tell us that they can 
demand cheaper or more efficient solutions as opposed to earlier when the process owners had 
primacy. However, we find that there is a challenge in terms of support roles and giving a 
larger accountability to the managers. In some cases, managers tell us that support roles such 
as the COO-organisation or HR tend to not have the full picture, thus making life harder for 
the country managers. This is in relation to the disconnect that we have mentioned earlier. The 
difficulty for Statoil is to balance the autonomous features of MS Roadmap with the “control” 
features of supporting roles. We find that, although the situation is better now than before, this 
is a field where Statoil still can improve.  
Note: When we wrote this thesis, MS Roadmap’s implementation process was yet to be 
completed. Thus, our findings are based on the process so far.   
RM 100: 
Overall, we find that there exists a supportive attitude towards RM100. It is viewed as a useful 
tool that enables the employees to deal with risk management with the necessary detail level 
and precision.  
The positive feedback is largely due to the extensive implementation efforts conducted by the 
corporate risk team which has led to a situation where the users both support and understand 
the underlying logic behind the procedure. Having said that, from a theoretical point of view, 
we urge Statoil to reconsider the top-down approach it has applied when implementing RM100 
where they have relied upon on managers to educate their employees. According to theory, 
they should have used a more direct style to ensure that the users of RM100 are sufficiently 
educated on the subject. Although we recognise the difficulty of doing this in an organisation 
of Statoil’s size, one should always seek to communicate as directly as possible as this, in most 
cases, will lead to a greater understanding and acceptance of the underlying concepts.  
Furthermore, the users also expressed that they are appreciate of the support available to them 
from discipline experts when conducting the risk assessments. They see them as useful tools 
that help them to comply with the rules and instructions that exist. Furthermore, the users 
expressed that they believe risk assessments has become a more efficient and concise 
procedure through the introduction of RM100. The standardised risk formats also make it more 
 110
possible to communicate with others in the organisation about risk, something they appreciate.  
 
Having said that, we find that the users see certain challenges in terms of the scales that are 
used for measuring risk in the procedure. The country managers fear that the risk assessments 
will lose the necessary level of detail when applying scores to the different risks that exist. 
Specifically, they are concerned with what will happen if risk assessments are solely based on 
the scores themselves and not the reasoning that lies behind them. Instead, they believe that 
the scoring system should only be used as a point of discussion rather than as the overall 
measurement of risk. The following can be problematic for the corporate leadership who rely 
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9 Appendix  
Interview guide  
Introduction 
1. A presentation of interviewers 
 115 
a. A presentation of us, NHH and the FOCUS-project 
b. An introduction of the topic of our thesis 
 
2. Information about the interview 
a. Anonymous, time frame, the use of a recorders  
b. We will be asking about their experiences and opinions regarding RM100 and 
the recent structural changes that have been made.  
c. The interview is divided into three parts: RM100, about the structural 
changes and around the international context.  
 
3. Interviewee presents himself/herself  
a. Role, function and responsibilities in Statoil, numbers of years on the job  
b. Role of interviewees department  
 
Part 1: RM100 
1. Implementation  
a. How were risk procedures managed in your area of work before RM100 was 
introduced? 
b. Describe how RM100 was implemented in your department? 
c. Did you have the chance to influence the design of RM100? 
 
2. Use 
a. What do you like and dislike about using RM100? Does it comply with how 
you personally would want to deal with risk at Statoil?  
b. What is the common opinion of RM100 in your department? 
c. Has the introduction of RM100 improved the way Statoil manages risk? 
Why/Why not? 
 
3. About the formalisation  
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a. When applying RM100, if you or your subordinates find something that 
doesn’t comply with the requirements, what does the process tell you to do? 
Fix it and move on or report to management and sit still? 
b. Why do you think management changed how risk is managed in Statoil? Did 
you and your colleagues feel the need for a change to happen? 
c. Does RM100 allow for necessary contextual alterations to the process? What 
is management’s view one this? 
 
Part 2: The Structural Change – MS Roadmap  
1. Implementation 
a. How were the structural changes implemented by management? 
b. Did you have a say in what way the structural changes should be made? 
 
2. Use 
a. How has your mandate altered since the structural change?  
b. What are the pros and cons of your new situation compared to before?  
c. Which control system features limit your mandate? (targets, procedures, rules 
etc.) How does this affect your work?  
d. How does your increased autonomy correspond with the standardisation that 
the implementation of RM100 represents?      
 
3. About the formalisation 
a. What mandate do you have should you find anything wrong within your 
own department? (machine breakdowns, people who aren’t doing their 
jobs, the need for new equipment, wrong strategic focus etc.)  
b. Why do you think they made the structural changes? Did you and your 
colleagues feel the need for a change to happen? 
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c. Is it encouraged by management to cooperate with other business areas 
on issues that are both related and not directly related to your business 
area? How do they facilitate this?  
d. To what degree can you now deviate from the instructions you have from 
your superiors if you find it necessary?  
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